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ARTICLES
A UNIFORM STANDARD FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
Judith J. Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The standards for exemplary damages in employment dis-
crimination cases are in disarray.' The major federal provisions
that prohibit private employment discrimination, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),2 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§
1981"),' the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),
and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),5 all have an
indistinguishably worded standard for assessing exemplary
damages: "reckless indifference to federally protected rights."6
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. BA., 1969, University of
Texas at Austin; J.D., 1974, University of Mississippi. I would like to thank Elizabeth
Jones, Mark Modak-Truran, Matthew Steffey, and Carol West for editorial assistance
and Beverly Ray for editorial and research assistance.
1. This article is a sequel to an article I published a few years ago in which I
articulated an interpretation of the standard for assessing punitive damages under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Judith J. Johnson, A Standard for
Punitive Damages Under Title VII, 46 FLA. L. REV. 521 (1994) [hereinafter Johnson,
Punitive Damages].
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
5. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,117 (1994).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 1981a(b)(1), 12,117(a) (1994); see infra Part IV.
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As I predicted in an earlier article,7 the courts have had
considerable difficulty in articulating a uniform standard for
exemplary damages.' These problems have included the courts'
conflicting interpretations of the standard for punitive damages,
inability to articulate any standard at all, and arbitrary treat-
ment of punitive damages claims.9 The Supreme Court has
granted a petition for writ of certiorari in Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass'n1 ° to resolve the conflict. Whether the problem will
be solved or exacerbated will depend on whether the Court
recognizes the advisability of a common standard for the ADEA,
Title VII, the ADA, and § 1981. Because all four of these acts
share a common body of law interpreting the meaning of dis-
crimination, a common interpretation of exemplary damages
would likewise be desirable.
In my earlier article, I recommended that the standard for
punitive damages under Title VII be the same as that approved
by the Supreme Court for liquidated damages, which are the
equivalent of punitive damages, under the ADEA." At that
time, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,12 which allowed imposition
of punitive damages for the first time in Title VII and ADA
cases, had been in effect for only three years, not long enough
for the development of a critical mass of case law. The case law
has developed quickly, and the confusion is evident. 3
7. Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See id.
10. 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998).
11. Exemplary damages under the ADEA are liquidated damages, but the Su-
preme Court has held that such damages under the ADEA were designed to be puni-
tive. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985). The 1991
Civil Rights Act uses the term "reckless indifference" as opposed to Thurston's "reck-
less disregard." See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071,
1073; Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126. The difference in terminology is irrelevant. The
Court in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), used the term "reckless disregard," and
there is no doubt that the standards under § 1981 and the 1991 Civil Rights Act
should be the same. See Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 964 (communicating "[t]hat Congress
ultimately enacted language similar to that employed in Smith v. Wade"); infra text
accompanying notes 101-06.
I use the term "exemplary damages" throughout the article when I intend to
refer to both punitive damages under § 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and
liquidated damages under the ADEA. When I am referring to one or the other, I
generally use the terms punitive or liquidated damages.
12. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
13. See infra Part III.B.
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The wording of the standard for exemplary damages under
the ADEA is virtually identical to the wording of the standard
for punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
the related statute, § 1981. Unfortunately, and although the
wording of the standards is indistinguishable, the courts inter-
pret it differently.14 The courts are fairly uniform in their in-
terpretation of the standard for exemplary damages under the
ADEA,5 but only after some years of the same sort of confu-
sion occurring today under § 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of
1991. This article revisits and expands on the recommendation
that the standard for punitive damages under Title VII be the
same as the standard for exemplary damages under the ADEA,
in light of recent case law under all four acts.
Under the ADEA, 6 § 1981,' Title VII"8 and the ADA, 9
14. See infra Parts III.B., IV.
15. See infra Part V.D.
16. See, e.g., Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125.
17. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983). Smith v. Wade is a § 1983 case
that has been universally applied to § 1981 as well. See, e.g., Williamson v. Handy
Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir. 1987); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777
F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985); Block v. R.H. Macy & Co., 712 F.2d 1241, 1246
(8th Cir. 1983).
Sections 1981 and 1983 are part of the Civil Rights Acts enacted after the
Civil War to protect the newly freed slaves. See BARBARA LNDEMAINN ScHLEI & PAUL
GROSSiAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRMINATION LAW 668 (2d ed. 1983). Section 1983 affords
a remedy for intentional discrimination, prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, see id. at
678, and § 1981 provides another remedy for private intentional discrimination, see
id. at 668-78.
18. The punitive damage provision for Title VII reads as follows:
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages
(1) Determination of punitive damages-A complaining party may recover
punitive damages under this section against a respondent (other than a
government, government agency or political subdivision) if the complain-
ing party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory
practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indif-
ference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
19. The 1991 Civil Rights Act, which added compensatory and punitive damages
as a remedy to Title VII, also added compensatory and punitive damages as a rem-
edy for a violation of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994). Section 1981a(a)(2)
provides:
(2) Disability-In an action brought by a complaining party under the
powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 or 2000e-16] (as provided
in section 107(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42
U.S.C. 12117(a)), and section 749a(a)(1) of title 29, respectively) against a
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an
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the minimum standard for assessing exemplary damages is
"reckless indifference" to federally protected rights. ° Under the
ADEA, exemplary damages are liquidated damages and are pos-
sible only if there is a willful violation.2 According to the Su-
employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) un-
der section 791 of title 29 and the regulations implementing section 791
of title 29, or who violated the requirements of section 791 of title 29 or
the regulations implementing section 791 of title 29 concerning the provi-
sion of a reasonable accommodation, or section 102 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12112), or committed a violation of
section 102(b)(5) of the Act against an individual, the complaining party
may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection
(b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
Id.
The only difference in the treatment of the ADA and Title VII by the 1991 Act
is the provision of a good faith defense for the employer who has made good faith
reasonable efforts to reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs disability. See id. §
1981a(a)(3). Section 1981a(a)(3) provides:
(3) Reasonable accommodation and good faith effort-In cases where a
discriminatory practice involves the provision of a reasonable accommoda-
tion pursuant to section 102(b)(5) of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 [42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)] or regulations implementing section 791 of
title 29, damages may not be awarded under this section where the cov-
ered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the per-
son with the disability who has informed the covered entity that accom-
modation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable accommodation
that would provide such individual with an equally effective opportunity
and would not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the business.
Id.
20. Under the ADEA, the Court added the term "knowledge," as well as "reckless
disregard." See, e.g., Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128. Under Title VII, the actual language
includes "malice," as well as "reckless indifference." Because "knowledge" and "malice"
are generally more culpable states of mind than recklessness, the latter is the salient
standard. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 536-38; infra note 166.
Under § 1981, courts have interpreted the standard for punitive damages to be
"reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiffs rights, as well as intentional violations
of federal law." Smith, 461 U.S. at 51; see also Williamson, 817 F.2d at 1296;
Stallworth, 777 F.2d at 1435; Block, 712 F.2d at 1246.
21. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that certain provisions for remedies of the Fair
Labor Standards Act apply to the ADEA and that liquidated damages, which are
double damages, are available for willful violations. See id.
The same remedial provisions apply as well to the Equal Pay Act of 1963
("EPA"), which is an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Equal Pay Act
of 1963 § 3(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 216 (actual remedial provi-
sions). The EPA prohibits sex discrimination in pay for equal work. The EPA is an-
other act that is related to Title VII. See generally, e.g., County of Wash. v. Gunther,
452 U.S. 161 (1981). The willfulness standard is the same under the EPA and under
the ADEA (reckless disregard to federally protected rights.) Compare McLaughlin v.
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preme Court, the employer acts willfully when he recklessly
disregards the plaintiffs rights under the ADEA.22 Similarly,
under Title VII, exemplary damages are punitive damages, and
by statute may be imposed only for intentional violations that
are in "reckless indifference to . . . federally protected
rights."' Likewise, a violation of § 1981 requires proof of in-
tentional discrimination, but the courts have interpreted the
standard for punitive damages to be "reckless or callous disre-
gard for the plaintiffs rights, as well as intentional violations of
federal law."'
Section 1981, the ADEA, and the ADA have been closely
associated with Title VII. Claims under § 1981, which provides
another remedy for private intentional race-related employment
discrimination,' have commonly been joined with Title VII
claims. Courts in Title VII cases have frequently cited cases
decided under § 1981 and vice versa.26 After the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, Title VII and § 1981 became more inextricably
connected. The primary impetus for the addition of compensato-
ry and punitive damages as a remedy for Title VII was that
claimants could recover those damages for race, color, and na-
tional origin discrimination under § 1981, but damages were
not available under Title VII for sex and religious discrimina-
tion. Section 1981a of the 1991 Civil Rights Act now allows
the plaintiff to recover compensatory and punitive damages in
Title VII cases, provided that such damages are not recoverable
under § 1981.' It is imperative, then, that the standard for
Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988), with Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121. See general-
ly JOEL W. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRMInATION 948 (4th ed. 1997).
22. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 614 (1993) (quoting Thurston,
469 U.S. at 126).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994). For the full text of this provision, see supra
note 18.
24. Smith, 461 U.S. at 30.
25. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
26. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 538.
27. See David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8
LAB. LAW. 849, 857 (1992). Relief under Title VII was originally limited to equitable
relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994). Section 1981a(a)(1) provides:
(a) Right of recovery
(1) Civil rights-In an action brought by a complaining party
under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.
1999]
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punitive damages be the same for both § 1981 and Title VII.
The connection between Title VII and the ADEA arises from
the fact that the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADEA
were taken virtually word for word from Title VII.29 For this
reason, the courts have commonly used Title VII cases to inter-
pret the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADEA.3" Similar-
ly, the courts have used Title VII as an authoritative body of
law for the ADA as well."' Furthermore, § 1981a, the damages
provision of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, applies to the ADA,32 as
2000e-5, 2000e-16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful inten-
tional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful be-
cause of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717
of the Act [42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-16], and provided that the
complaining party cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as
allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief autho-
rized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respon-
dent.
Id.
The provision for compensatory and punitive damages also applies to actions
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12,117(a) (1994), and
to section 505(a)(1) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1994).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). The damages, however, are capped as follows:
(3) Limitations-The sum of the amount of compensatory damages
awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded
under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than
101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than
201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, $300,000.
Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
29. See Judith J. Johnson, Semantic Cover For Age Discrimination: Twilight of the
ADEA, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 8 nn.25 & 27 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Semantic
Cover].
30. See id. at 11.
31. See generally FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 21, at 1033-34.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994). For the full text of this provision, see
supra note 19.
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well as to Title VII." If the standard for exemplary damages
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and § 1981 were interpreted
to be the same as the standard for such damages under the
ADEA, all of the major federal legislation that prohibit private
employment discrimination would be interpreted consistently. 4
The problem with all of these anti-discrimination provisions
is that, in cases of disparate treatment, the defendant has en-
gaged in intentional discrimination.35 Such intentional miscon-
duct necessarily requires more than mere recklessness. Accord-
ingly, all the statutory schemes discussed above ostensibly re-
quire a less culpable state of mind for the imposition of exem-
plary damages than the state of mind necessary to find liabili-
ty. Consequently, the courts have had trouble instructing a jury
in an intentional discrimination case on when to assess puni-
tive damages.36 The problem is that the jury must be instruct-
ed that, in order to find the defendant liable, they must find
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff on the basis of a prohibited characteristic (race, sex,
etc.). Then, in order to award punitive damages, the jury must
find that the defendant acted with "reckless indifference" to the
plaintiffs rights. The difficulty for the judge is explaining to a
jury how, even if the defendant specifically intended to dis-
criminate, it did not necessarily act with reckless indifference to
the plaintiffs rights. 7 The solution, as the Court has held
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994). For the full text of this provision, see
supra note 28.
34. This would also include the EPA because its liquidated damages provision is
construed the same as the ADEA. See generally FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note
21, at 948. For a further discussion of the EPA, see supra note 21 and infra note
291.
35. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 534-35. Liquidated damages
are not statutorily limited under the ADEA to cases of disparate treatment. In Hazen
Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), however, the latest case on the standard for
liquidated damages, the Court cast doubt on whether the disparate impact model of
proof applies at all to the ADEA. See id. at 610; see also Johnson, Semantic Cover,
supra note 29, at 61. After Hazen Paper, "[tihere appears to be a trend among the
circuit courts to reject the availability of impact claims in ADEA actions." FRIEDMAN
& STRICKLER, supra note 21, at 990. Disparate impact does not require proof of in-
tent to discriminate. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). There-
fore, if unintentional discrimination is not possible under the ADEA, the problem is
the same for the ADEA as it is for Title VII, which only imposes punitive damages
in intentional discrimination cases.
36. See discussion infra Parts lI.B., IV.D.
37. This difficulty is exacerbated by a renewed interest in the agency principles of
1999]
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under the ADEA, is to distinguish between the defendant's
state of mind with regard to the act of discrimination and the
defendant's state of mind with regard to the law that prohibits
the discriminatory act.
In order to illustrate the efficacy of this solution, this article
will compare recent case law developed under the ADEA with
recent case law developed under the 1991 Civil Rights Act and
§ 1981 to demonstrate that the difficulty in articulating a work-
able standard has apparently been solved under the ADEA, but
not under the other anti-discrimination statutes.
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,"s the Court an-
nounced that the standard for determining a willful violation of
the ADEA and awarding liquidated damages is "reckless dis-
regard" of the plaintiffs federally protected rights. 9 After
Thurston, the lower courts were unable to apply the standard
correctly.40 This situation continued even after the Court reit-
erated the Thurston standard in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe
Co.41 More recently, the Supreme Court explained again in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins42 that the standard was "reckless
indifference," but clarified what that meant: "[ilf an employer
incorrectly but in good faith and nonrecklessly believes that the
statute permits a particular age-based decision, then liquidated
Title VII. See discussion infra Part III.B. Some courts have held that punitive dam-
ages cannot be awarded against the company which did not know of the discriminato-
ry acts of its supervisor. See, e.g., Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927,
944 (5th Cir. 1996). Courts will generally attribute the conduct of the supervisory em-
ployees to the company for purposes of compensatory damages but may require more
direct complicity by the highest officials of the company to support punitive damage
awards, regardless of how egregious the violation was. See id. at 942. Because the
courts generally cite the principles developed by the Supreme Court in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), for assessing supervisory liability,
the Court's recent clarification of those principles should alleviate this problem. See
infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
38. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
39. Id. at 126.
40. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 615.
41. 486 U.S. i28, 133 (1988). After Thurston, the question had remained whether
the standard for willfulness would apply as well to the question of whether to apply
the longer statute of limitations for a willful violation. This case involved a Fair
Labor Standards Act violation. At the time, the ADEA and the Fair Labor Standards
Act were identical with regard to the consequences for a willful violation. See general-
ly FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 21, at 1023-24.
42. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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damages should not be imposed."4" After the Hazen Paper case,
the courts generally have been able to apply the standard cor-
rectly. Why did resolution of the issue take so long? The "reck-
less indifference" standard for an intentional violation was sim-
ply unworkable until further refined by the Court in Hazen
Paper.
This article re-asserts the desirability of the interpretation of
the standard for liquidated damages under the ADEA as clari-
fied by Hazen Paper and recommends that that interpretation
be applied to the other anti-discrimination statutes, § 1981, the
ADA, as well as Title V1I. 4 In effect, punitive damages should
be presumptively appropriate in all cases in which the defen-
dant has intentionally discriminated, absent a showing that the
employer believed in good faith based on reasonable grounds
that he was not violating the statutory rights of the plaintiff.
The article explains the four principal anti-discrimination
laws and the theories of discrimination generally in Part II.
Part III discusses the historical development of the standard for
punitive damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act and § 1981
and frames the problem by presenting recent cases under the
1991 Civil Rights Act and § 1981. Part IV elucidates the solu-
tion by discussing the relevant Supreme Court cases under the
ADEA and the recent interpretation of those cases by the lower
courts. Part V recommends that the Supreme Court adopt the
same standard for punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 as it adopted for willful violations under the ADEA.
Part VI concludes.
43. Id. at 616.
44. The punitive damages provision of § 1981a requires that the plaintiff demon-
strate reckless indifference. However, it is the position of this article that, having
proven intentional discrimination, the plaintiff has demonstrated reckless indifference
as well. It is not clear who bears the burden of persuasion of proving good faith in
ADEA cases, but it is likely that the plaintiff bears the burden on this issue. See
FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 21, at 1029. The defendant, however, should be
responsible for at least articulating a basis for good faith reasonable belief, regardless
of who bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.
1999]
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II. THE PRINCIPAL FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND
THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION GENERALLY
A. The Principal Federal Anti-Discrimination Acts
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644" prohibits an em-
ployer from hiring, discharging or otherwise discriminating with
regard to any term or condition of employment because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.4" In 1967, Congress
passed the ADEA to prohibit discrimination based on age.
Because the wording of the prohibitions against age discrimina-
tion in the ADEA was taken word for word from Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4" the ADEA now ostensibly pro-
vides the same basic protections from discrimination based on
age for people over forty49 that Title VII provides based on
race, sex, religion, color and national origin.5"
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
46. See id. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
47. Congress originally passed the ADEA to prohibit discrimination based on age
against persons aged 40 to 65. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 602, 607. The upper age limit was raised to 70 in
1978, see Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, §§ 3(a), 12(a), 92 Stat. 189, and then removed altogether in 1986, see Age
Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100
Stat. 3342.
48. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
49. As set forth immediately below, the protections appear to be the same-but
may be different in practice. See Johnson, Semantic Cover, supra note 29, at 8 n.26.
50. The ADEA provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's age.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994) (emphasis
added).
Title VII provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
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The main difference originally between the two Acts, for the
purposes of this article, can be found in their remedies."' The
remedial provisions of the ADEA were drawn from the Fair
Labor Standards Act and provide for liquidated damages for
willful violations.2  The Supreme Court has held that the vio-
lation is willful if "the employer ... knew or showed reckless
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited
by the ADEA."53
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis add-
ed).
The italicized provisions above indicate the differences between Title VII and
the ADEA. The only real difference between the two statutory provisions cited above
is that the ADEA does not mention applicants, although discriminatory hiring is
forbidden. The term "applicants" was added to Title VII in 1972 after Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and after the ADEA to "perfect the Title VII provi-
sions dealing with .. . apprenticeship training." H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 19-20
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155-56.
51. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994);
Johnson, Semantic Cover, supra note 29, at 9 n.28.
In addition to the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") and seniority
defenses also available under Title VII, Congress added other defenses to the ADEA
that were not found in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-2(e), (h) (1994). These include
any action that the employer takes based on "reasonable factors other than age" or
pursuant to a bona fide benefit plan, as well as discipline or discharge for good
cause. Until the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the courts usually interpreted the ADEA
consistently with Title VII, an approach that the courts considered appropriate and
desirable. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Monce v. City
of San Diego, 895 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYER DIS-
CRIMINATION LAW 517 (1988); Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Dis-
parate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229,
230-31 (1990); cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). The BFOQ defense is
not absolute under Title VII but only applies to sex, religious and national origin
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). There are defenses under Title VII which
are not contained in the ADEA as well, such as action taken pursuant to a merit
system or a system which measures quantity or quality of production or a profession-
ally developed test. See id. § 2000e-2(h).
52. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
53. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1985).
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Until recently, the remedies for Title VII were purely equita-
ble and included such relief as backpay and reinstatement.5
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added a provision for compensa-
tory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination when
the defendant acts with "reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual."55 Because the
ADEA allows liquidated damages for "reckless disregard" when
the conduct is prohibited by the ADEA,56 obviously, the stan-
dards for exemplary damages under Title VII and the ADEA
are virtually the same.57 The lower courts, however, do not
interpret the standards the same way. 8
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrim-
ination based on disability, was also modeled on Title VII.59
Although not taken word for word from Title VII as was the
ADEA, the ADA contains the same basic concept of discrimina-
tion.6° The courts have thus looked to the principles developed
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994). For the full text of this provision, see supra
note 18.
56. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126.
57. See supra note 11.
58. See infra Part III.B. Compare cases cited in Part III.B. with cases cited in
Part IV (despite the similarity in drafting, courts continue to interpret the two acts
with inconsistency).
59. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 21, at 1033-34.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (1994). This section provides:
Discrimination-
(a) General rule
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of em-
ployees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.
(b) Construction
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term "discriminate"
includes-
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee
in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such appli-
cant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relation-
ship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant
or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this
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under Title VII to interpret the anti-discrimination provisions of
the ADA,6 and after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the ADA
and Title VII have a common authorization for damages. 2
Under the ADA, the plaintiff must prove that he is a quali-
fied person with a disability."3 Once the plaintiff has shown
the requisite disability, the defendant must show that he can-
subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment
or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits
to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing
training and apprenticeship programs);
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration-
(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability;
or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to
common administrative control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a quali-
fied individual because of the known disability of an individual with
whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or associa-
tion;
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physi-
cal or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a dis-
ability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employ-
ee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such
denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable
accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or
applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selec-
tion criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard,
test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to
be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business
necessity; and
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in
the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered
to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory,
manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills,
aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that
such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired senso-
ry, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except
where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure).
Id.
61. See generally FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 21, at 1033-34.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994). For the full text of this provision, see
supra note 19.
63. See generally FRIEDMAN & STICKLER, supra note 21, at 1041-42.
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not reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs disability without
undue hardship."
"Reasonable accommodation without undue hardship" is a
concept which was developed under Title VII with respect to
the prohibition against religious discrimination.65 The differ-
ence between the application of the concept to the ADA is that
undue hardship is much easier to show for religious discrimina-
tion than for disability discrimination.66 The principle of rea-
sonable accommodation is otherwise the same for both Acts.
Therefore, the defendant may be guilty of discrimination not
only in intentionally preferring a person of another religion or
in preferring a non-disabled person, but the defendant may also
be discriminating if he does not make certain concessions to the
religious practices or the disability.67
There is one other difference in the application of the reason-
able accommodation requirement of Title VII and the ADA. By
statute under the ADA, if the defendant makes an offer of what
he believes in good faith is a reasonable accommodation, then
he cannot be assessed damages." Therefore, the idea of good
faith as a defense to punitive damages-the solution this article
proposes-is not unknown under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Unfortunately, other than the specific situation of a good faith
offer to accommodate, the courts have not required proof of the
employer's good faith to avoid punitive damages under the
ADA.
3. Section 1981
Section 198169 was enacted after the Civil War to protect
64. See id. at 1050-51.
65. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977) (providing
a history of the development of the concept of "reasonable accommodation without
undue hardship" under Title VII); see also Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662
F.2d 292, 308 n.22 (5th Cir. 1981).
66. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 21, at 1050.
67. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 71-76.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994). For the full text of this provision, see
supra note 19.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
[Vol. 33:41
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
the newly freed slaves.7" Section 1981, which "on its face re-
lates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and en-
forcement of contracts,"7 ' also provides another remedy, in ad-
dition to Title VII for private intentional employment discrimi-
nation.72 Under § 1981, the prohibited discrimination is limited
to race, color, and national origin.7" Section 1981 claims and
Title VII are often joined because they provide different reme-
dies for the same wrong.' Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
§ 1981 allowed the plaintiff to recover compensatory and pu-
nitive damages,75 while the remedies under Title VII were lim-
ited to equitable relief.76 The 1991 Civil Rights Act allows the
plaintiff to recover damages in situations in which she cannot
recover damages under § 1981. Presumably this means that
plaintiffs can recover damages for sex and religious discrimi-
nation under Title VII and damages for race, color, and nation-
al origin discrimination under § 1981. 77 The consequence is
that if a plaintiff wants to recover damages for race, color, or
national origin discrimination under Title VII, he must sue
under both Title VII and § 1981. As a result, there are fewer
recent employment discrimination cases currently being decided
under § 1981 alone.7"
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Id.
Section 1981 was reenacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1870 after the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. See ScHIRi & GRossi1AN, supra note 17, at 668.
70. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 678-85.
71. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
72. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 669-78.
73. See id. at 673-75.
74. The -'remedies available to the individual under Title VII are co-extensive
with the indiv[i]dual's right to sue under the provisions of. . .§ 1981, and that the
two procedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive.'" Johnson, 421
U.S. at 460 (citation omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-238,
at 19 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2154).
75. See id.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
77. See Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 27, at 858.
78. See generally cases cited infra Part II.B.
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B. Theories of Discrimination
The Supreme Court has developed two theories of discrimina-
tion under Title VII: disparate treatment7 9 and disparate im-
pact."0 Both theories apply to the ADA, 1 while § 1981 only
recognizes the disparate treatment theory.8 2 The courts univer-
sally apply the disparate treatment theory to the ADEA,8' but
whether the disparate impact theory applies to the ADEA is
less certain. 4
Disparate treatment occurs when the employer intentionally
discriminates against an employee based on race, sex, religion,
color, or national origin under Title VII;"5 age under the
ADEA,8  disability under the ADA,17 and race, color, and na-
tional origin under § 1981.88 The only question under the dis-
parate treatment theory is whether the employer intentionally
treated the employee differently because of her protected status.
On the other hand, the disparate impact theory applies to em-
ployment criteria that eliminate more persons of a certain pro-
tected class than others.8 " Proof of intent to discriminate is
unnecessary in a disparate impact case;9 rather, the proof is
based on statistical analysis of the impact of the employer's em-
ployment criteria on a protected class.9'
79. See generally Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
80. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
81. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 21, at 1033-34.
82. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 528-39.
83. See Johnson, Semantic Cover, supra note 29, at 13-20.
84. See supra note 35.
85. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
86. See PLAYER, supra note 51, at 517.
87. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 21, at 1033-34.
88. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975);
Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 27, at 880-81.
89. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Steven L.
Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM.
U. L. REV. 799 (1985) (discussing the difference between the two theories).
90. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
91. See ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 98-102.
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Under Title VII and the ADA, damages are available only in
disparate treatment cases, not in disparate impact cases,92 for
which the remedy is equitable relief." Section 1981 also ap-
plies only to cases of intentional discrimination (disparate treat-
ment), and damages are part of the remedy allowed under §
1981.94
With regard to the ADEA, the Supreme Court has said, and
many lower courts agree, that the disparate impact model may
not be appropriate in an ADEA case. 5 If this is so, then the
remedy for a violation of the ADEA, which may include liqui-
dated damages, would be available only in the circumstances
for which damages are available under the other anti-discrimi-
nation provisions, that is, for intentional discrimination.
Whether or not the disparate impact theory applies to the
ADEA, the problem remains in the differing standards required
for proof of intentional discrimination and "reckless indiffer-
ence" required for exemplary damages. Because the problem of
different standards for determining the defendant's intent does
not arise in disparate impact cases, this article will concentrate
on the problem as it arises in disparate treatment cases.
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
93. See id.; infra note 100.
94. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
95. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993); see also Johnson,
Semantic Cover, supra note 29 (in which I argue that disparate impact should apply
to the ADEA); supra note 35; cf Jan W. Henkel, The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act: Disparate Analysis and the Availability of Liquidated Damages after Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1183, 1193-1200 (1997).
96. Because disparate impact does not require any showing of illegal intent, if the
disparate impact model was recognized as appropriate in an ADEA case, imposing
liquidated damages based on a showing of reckless indifference to the plaintiffs rights
would be easier to apply. In other words, because the plaintiff does not have to show
intent to discriminate in a disparate impact case, liquidated damages would be appro-
priate upon a showing that the employer in fact had some illegal intent. See Johnson,
Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 535 n.21 (discussing the possible interpretations
of the state of mind of one who engages in disparate impact discrimination).
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III. THE STANDARD FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 AND § 1981
A. Historical Development of the Standard
The 1991 Civil Rights Act allows recovery of punitive damag-
es if the "respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or
discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indiffer-
ence to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individu-
al."97 The "reckless indifference" state of mind required for pu-
nitive damages was new to Title VII and the ADA,9' but not
new to § 1981, 99 which is closely allied with Title VII. ° Be-
cause § 1981 and Title VII provide different remedies for the
same wrong, they are often considered together,"1 and § 1981
jurisprudence relating to punitive damages was the most natu-
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994). For the full text of this provision, see supra
note 18.
98. It should be noted that both Title VII and § 1981 allow the imposition of
punitive damages if the defendant acts with malice under Title VII or intent to dis-
criminate under § 1981. As I discussed at length in my original article on a standard
for punitive damages, because these states of mind are worse than mere recklessness,
the salient state of mind is the minimum required for the imposition of punitive
damages, reckless indifference, common to both acts. See Johnson, Punitive Damages,
supra note 1, at 537.
"Malice with reference to punitive damages under Title VII also should compre-
hend a high degree of recklessness which indicates indifference to bringing about the
statutorily proscribed result, the discrimination, as well as the specific intent to dis-
criminate." Id. at 537.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
100. Section 1981 was enacted after the Civil War as the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Although "on its face [it] relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and
enforcement of contracts," the Supreme Court held that § 1981 "affords a federal
remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race." Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). "Congress noted 'that
the remedies available to the individual under Title VII are co-extensive with the
indiv[i]duars right to sue under the provisions of ... § 1981, and that the two pro-
cedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive.'" Id. at 459 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 19 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2154) (cita-
tion omitted) (alteration in original). When the amendment to Title VII providing for
compensatory and punitive damages was passed, Congress again tied the two provi-
sions together by stipulating that this recovery was only available if the plaintiff
could not recover under § 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
The remedies under Title VII and § 1981 were quite different before the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Section 1981 has always allowed the plaintiff to recover compen-
satory and punitive damages. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460. Title VII only afforded
equitable relief before the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
101. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459.
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ral source for a standard under Title VII. Furthermore, the
standard for punitive damages applied to § 1981 was an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Wade to be "reck-
less or callous disregard for the plaintiffs rights, as well as
intentional violations of federal law." °2 Therefore, under both
Title VII and § 1981, the minimum standard for punitive dam-
ages is the "reckless disregard of protected rights." Because the
remedial provision is the same for Title VII and the ADA, the
ADA must also share in the same interpretation. 3
The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act strongly
indicates that it was intended to unify the standards for puni-
tive damages for § 1981 and for Title VII. In Patterson v.
P.H.P. Healthcare Corp.,"°4 the Fifth Circuit cited this legisla-
tive history, saying that:
[plunitive damages were unavailable to Title VII plaintiffs
until the enactment of the 1991 Amendments to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Congress's primary
concern with enacting punitive damages under § 1981a(b)(1)
was to unify the law under Title VII. In furtherance of this
unification effort, Congress permitted the imposition of
punitive damages under Title VII in the same general cir-
cumstances as punitive damage awards imposed by courts
under § 1981 .... "Punitive damages are available under [§
1981a] to the same extent and under the same standards
that they are available to plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
No higher standard may be imposed."10 5
102. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983). Although Smith v. Wade is a decision
interpreting § 1983, the courts universally hold that the standard announced therein
is applicable to § 1981 as well. See, e.g., Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817
F.2d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir. 1987); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir.
1985); Block v. R.H. Macy & Co., 712 F.2d 1241, 1246 (8th Cir. 1983).
The language of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is somewhat different, but has es-
sentially the same meaning. Smith v. Wade shunned the term "malice" because of its
vagueness. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 39 n.8. Congress did use the term malice in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, despite the fact that Smith v. Wade had rejected this term
and that the case applies to Title VI's most analogous provision, § 1981. So it is
possible that Congress intended something different. Because the minimum standard,
"reckless indifference," is the same for § 1981 and Title Vii, however, what Congress
meant in using the term malice is fairly irrelevant. For further discussion, see supra
note 11.
103. See supra note 19. Courts are in agreement that the standard must be the
same. See cases cited infra Part III.B.
104. 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
105. Id. at 941 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court articulated in Smith v. Wade the stan-
dard for punitive damages which applies to § 1981: "that reck-
less or callous disregard for the plaintiffs rights, as well as
intentional violations of federal law, should be sufficient to
trigger a jury's consideration of the appropriateness of punitive
damages."106 The Court clearly declined to require the thresh-
old for punitive damages to be higher than that required for
compensatory damages.' The only limitation the Court put
on the standard was that the jury, in its discretionary moral
judgment, must find that the conduct merits a punitive
award.0 8
Although Smith v. Wade was a § 1983 case, the courts hold
that the standard is applicable to § 1981 as well. °9 "Reckless
disregard for the plaintiffs rights" is indistinguishable from
"reckless indifference" to the plaintiffs rights, the standard for
punitive damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The courts
have, in fact, acknowledged that the standards are virtually
identical;"0 however, the fact that the courts have applied
consistent standards has worked to the disadvantage of the law
under both statutes. Applying the standard articulated in Smith
v. Wade,"' the courts have tried to distinguish between the
defendant's intentional discrimination, necessary for liability,
and its reckless indifference to the plaintiffs statutory rights,
necessary for punitive damages."' The attempt has been nota-
bly unsuccessful, mainly because the courts have often required
more evidence of the defendant's bad intent regarding the dis-
criminatory act rather than focusing on the defendant's state of
mind regarding the plaintiffs legal rights."'
106. Smith, 461 U.S. at 51.
107. See id. at 53.
108. See id. at 52.
109. See cases cited supra notes 17, 102.
110. See, e.g., Patterson, 90 F.3d at 927. For a discussion of why the difference in
terminology is insignificant, see supra note 11.
111. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 56.
112. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at Part III.C-D (providing earli-
er cases); infra Part III.B.
113. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at Part IH.C-D.
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As set out in greater detail in my earlier article, under §
1981, many courts, although purporting to follow Smith v.
Wade, have been unable to apply the standard correctly."'
They have instead tended either to make the standard for puni-
tive damages higher than reckless indifference to the plaintiffs
rights".5  or to require some evidence of aggravating
factors,"6 in direct contravention of the rule announced in
114. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at Part III.C.2. In Ngo v. Reno
Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1998), amended on petition for
reh'g, 156 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1998), the court acknowledged that Smith v. Wade was
the authoritative interpretation of the standard and that it had rejected the argument
that the standard for punitive damages must necessarily be higher than the standard
for liability. The court acknowledged, however, that many lower courts had neverthe-
less interpreted Smith v. Wade to require a heightened evidentiary showing for puni-
tive damages. The court then adopted the higher standard for Title VII. See Ngo, 140
F.3d at 1302-04. On petition for rehearing, the court amended the opinion to include
a reference to Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en
banc). See Ngo, 156 F.3d at 988. The court also changed its reference to the number
of circuit courts that require more than intentional discrimination from four to five.
See id.
115. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Associated Bldg. Contractors, Inc., 884 F.2d 1392, 1392
(6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (full text available on
Westlaw, No. 88-3953, 1989 WL 107734, at *2) (limiting punitive damages to cases
involving discrimination that is -'malicious, willful and in gross disregard of the
[plaintiffs] rights" (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Pool Mort-
gage Co., 868 F. 2d 1178, 1181 (10th Cir. 1989))); Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy-Prov-
ince of Detroit, Inc., 816 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1987) (limiting punitive damages to
cases involving egregious conduct or a showing of willfulness or malice on the part of
the defendant).
116. See, e.g, Black v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989) (un-
published table decision) (full text available on Westlaw, No. 88-5387, 1989 WL 2116,
at *2) (finding that there were insufficient subsidiary findings of fact in a bench trial
to support an award of punitive damages, despite the fact that the court referred to
plaintiffs testimony that she was subjected to verbal and physical racial abuse).
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Smith v. Wade. Courts often simply cite the standard and,
without further discussion, decide that the standard does... or
does not apply."8
Some courts were able to apply the standard in accord with
Smith v. Wade to § 1981 cases by looking at the purposes for
punitive damages. For example, one district court said that,
because punitive damages were designed to punish the defen-
dant for outrageous conduct and to deter such future conduct
by the defendant and others similarly situated, "[a] jury (or
other fact-finder) must make a discretionary moral judgment
that the policies of punishment and deterrence would be served
117. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Tower Oldsmobile, Inc., 789 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1986).
Here, the court characterized the plaintiffs case without further explanation as a
"close case for punitive damages" although the plaintiff, inter alia, was transferred to
an inferior work area by the defendant supervisor for the stated reason that he did
not want a black person in the front of the shop. When the owners of the company
refused to remedy the situation, the court said that the defendants were callously
indifferent to the plaintiffs protected rights. See id. at 510-14. In Walters v. City of
Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986), the court decided that, although the jury
had said all the defendants were responsible for the discrimination against the plain-
tiff, only one of the defendants acted with the requisite ill will or callous disregard
for the plaintiffs rights. With regard to that defendant, the court found the requisite
reckless disregard for the plaintiffs rights in the fact that this defendant had been
the one who refused to hire the plaintiff because she was concerned about his race
and who ultimately hired less qualified applicants. See id. at 1147-48. In Erebia v.
Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed an award of punitive damages because the plaintiff had continually complained
about racial harassment, and the defendants had failed to rectify the situation. Fur-
thermore, one manager had threatened to hurt the plaintiff economically if he contin-
ued to complain. See id. at 1252. The court described this conduct as malicious. See
id. at 1260. In Block v. R.H. Macy & Co., 712 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1983), the court
decided that purposeful racial discrimination, required to find a violation of § 1981,
and reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff could reasonably be inferred
from the same evidence. The defendant's personnel managers knew that the plaintiffs
supervisor was racially biased, but acceded to her request to discharge the plaintiff,
without making any further inquiry. See id. at 1246-47. Also, two white employees
engaged in the same conduct for which the plaintiff was discharged, but they were
not disciplined. Furthermore, the defendant replaced the plaintiff with a white person.
See id.
118. See, e.g., Beauford, 816 F.2d at 1108-09; Jackson v. McLeod, 748 F. Supp.
831, 836 (S.D. Ala. 1990).
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by an award of punitive damages."'19 The problem is, howev-
er, that the court could not guide the jury as to when those
conditions exist. 20
This situation mirrors the confusion which occurred after the
Court announced the "reckless disregard" standard for liquidat-
ed damages under the ADEA."2 In addition, the same confu-
sion is presently occurring in Title VII and ADA cases inter-
preting the "reckless indifference" standard for punitive damag-
es under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
22
The reason for this confusion, as I explained in my earlier
article, is that an intentional act of discrimination, required to
establish liability under Title VII, the ADA, and § 1981, evinces
a more culpable state of mind than the reckless conduct which
is required for punitive damages." Because punitive damages
are in the nature of an extraordinary remedy to punish the
119. Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 287-88 (N.D. Ind. 1985), over-
ruled by Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Natl Corp., 644 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ind. 1986). The
court decided that punitive damages were appropriate in this case in which the de-
fendant had condoned the regular sexual harassment of the plaintiff. See id. at 288.
120. In another district court case, the court denied punitive damages on the basis
that they would not serve a deterrent purpose because the events that led to the dis-
crimination were unique and not likely to be repeated. See Mister v. Illinois Cent.
Gulf R.R. Co., 790 F. Supp. 1411, 1424 (S.D. Ill. 1992).
In a Fifth Circuit case, the court, without citing Smith v. Wade, stated that the
standard for awarding punitive damages was acting willfully and with gross disregard
for the plaintiffs rights or acting maliciously, all without further discussion. See
Jones v. Western Geophysical Co., 761 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1985). The court
then noted that the district court should evaluate "'the nature of the conduct in ques-
tion, the wisdom of some form of pecuniary punishment, and the advisability of a
deterrent.' Id. at 1162 (quoting Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294
(5th Cir. 1990)). In analyzing the case under this standard, the court recognized that
discrimination is an abhorrent practice, but that the company was taking steps to
eliminate it and that the evidence was not clear that the defendant acted maliciously.
See id.
In Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989), the Tenth Circuit
provided a better reasoned distinction between the state of mind necessary to prove
intentional discrimination as opposed to the state of mind necessary for an award of
punitive damages. The court said that not every intentional violation subjects the
defendant to punitive damages. See id. at 867. The defendant may have thought it
was legitimate for him to discharge the plaintiff for inefficiency, but because the
belief was objectively unreasonable, the defendant was nevertheless guilty of discrimi-
nation. The court, however, said that punitive damages require an assessment of the
defendant's subjective state of mind. See id.
121. See infra Parts IVA, IV.D.
122. See generally infra Part III.B.2.
123. See generally Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1.
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defendant for an evil act, courts are naturally inclined to re-
quire a finding that the defendant's state of mind was worse
than the state of mind required for liability. However, because
the defendant is liable when he acted with the intent to bring
about the statutorily proscribed result, which is the most culpa-
ble state of mind in the law, his state of mind cannot be worse
for the purposes of imposing punitive damages. Discrimination
is itself egregious conduct. It is a great social and moral wrong,
proscribed by federal law. Additional proof of bad conduct is not
only unnecessary, but impossible to define."
Intent to discriminate under Title VII, the ADA, § 1981, and
the ADEA is simply intending to treat one person differently
from another because of one of the statutorily prohibited bases
for discrimination."5 The "intent to discriminate" requirement
of Title VII, the ADA and § 1981, which is the same for the
ADEA, is akin to the purposeful or intentional state of mind in
criminal law. 6 If the defendant intends to do the act that
brings about the statutorily proscribed result, that is, he in-
tends to treat people of different races differently because of
their race, sex, etc., then the defendant has acted with specific
intent comparable to purposefulness in criminal law." 7
124. See infra text accompanying notes 305-08.
125. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 534-35; supra text accom-
panying notes 85-88.
126. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 534-35.
127. I used a criminal law model in my earlier article because these definitions
were most analogous to the states of mind required under the 1991 Civil Rights Act:
malice, specific intent, and recklessness. See id. at 535.
The states of mind relevant to Title VII, "intent to discriminate,"
"malice" and "reckless indifference," have close analogies to significant
states of mind for criminal culpability. The purpose of punitive damages
in an employment discrimination case is to "punish a wrongdoer for his
outrageous conduct and to deter others from engaging in similar con-
duct." The purpose is penal, therefore, not remedial.
Criminal law is the source of the idea that a person's culpability
should be determined depending on his state of mind with regard to the
criminally proscribed act. The advantage of interpreting states of mind
with reference to the criminal law is that such states of mind are sus-
ceptible to concrete articulation. This would be useful, because vague
ideas, such as "ill will," obscure the issue of punitive damages and inhib-
it uniform imposition of a standard.
Id. (citations omitted).
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What causes the confusion is that the defendant meets the
standard for punitive or liquidated damages if he is merely
reckless, even though recklessness is an insufficiently culpable
state of mind for liability for intentional discrimination under
Title VII, the ADA, § 1981, or the ADEA."8 Without an initial
finding of intentional discrimination, the question of punitive
damages never arises.
"Recklessness in criminal law is the subjective awareness of a
high degree of risk that the criminally proscribed result will oc-
cur."i 29 The courts are then presented with the undesirable
possibility that the standard for punitive damages requires a
less culpable state of mind than the state of mind required for
liability. As the Court has recognized under the ADEA, howev-
er, distinction easily can be made. The statutory language re-
lates recklessness to the defendant's state of mind with regard
to the plaintiffs statutorily protected rights; therefore, there
must be a difference between intentionally treating people dif-
ferently because of race, for example, and doing so in reckless
disregard of the law that prohibits the particular kind of dis-
crimination.
Was Congress intending to allow the defendant to contend
that it discriminated on purpose but did not mean to break the
law? Surely not. Ignorance of the law has never been a defense
in a Title VII case;13 however, Congress may have intended
to allow some ignorance of the nuances of the law to be a de-
fense in this regard. As the Supreme Court said with regard to
age discrimination, imposing exemplary damages on the defen-
dant because he knew the ADEA was "in the picture" is an
unacceptably low standard simply because virtually all employ-
ers are aware that age discrimination is prohibited.' The
Court said there may, however, be cases in which the employer
would have a good faith belief based on reasonable grounds
that treating a person differently based on age was allowed by
the law. Absent such a showing, the assumption is that the
128. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 537.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir.
1996) (holding that ignorance of local custom is not a defense under § 1981).
131. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1985).
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employer was at least reckless with regard to a violation of the
law. 1
32
The Court instructed in Hazen Paper v. Biggins:
It is not true that an employer who knowingly relies on age
in reaching its decision invariably commits a knowing or
reckless violation of the ADEA. The ADEA is not an un-
qualified prohibition on the use of age in employment deci-
sions, but affords the employer a "bona fide occupational
qualification" defense, and exempts certain subject matters
and persons. If an employer incorrectly but in good faith
and nonrecklessly believes that the statute permits a partic-
ular age-based decision, then liquidated damages should not
be imposed .... Once a "willful" violation has been shown,
the employee need not additionally demonstrate that the
employer's conduct was outrageous, or provide direct evi-
dence of the employer's motivation, or prove that age was
the predominant, rather than a determinative, factor in the
employment decision.133
The same rationale pertains to the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Title VII and the ADA are also not absolute prohibitions
against discrimination based on the prohibited classifications.
Both have various exemptions and defenses. If the defendant
has intentionally discriminated against a person because of his
race or other prohibited characteristic, absent a good faith rea-
sonable belief that the discrimination was legal, he would have
acted recklessly with regard to the plaintiffs statutory rights.
That is, because all employers are aware that race discrimina-
tion is illegal, in order to impose punitive damages, the employ-
er who discriminates must be subjectively aware of a high de-
gree of risk that if he did the act he intended (treating people
differently because of race), he would be discriminating in viola-
tion of the law.
The Court had adopted the same reckless indifference stan-
dard applied to § 1981 in Smith v. Wade as it later adopted
and explained fully for the ADEA.134 Congress must have been
132. See id. at 128-29.
133. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 616-17 (1993) (citations omitted).
134. Compare Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121, with Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
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aware of these Supreme Court decisions when it used the same
language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.'
To recover punitive damages under Title VII, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant acted with malice or
reckless indifference.'36 It is the position of this article that,
once the plaintiff has shown that the defendant intentionally
discriminated, the plaintiff has met this burden. It should be
incumbent on the defendant to prove that he acted in good
faith based on reasonable grounds.'37 The most obvious de-
fense is that the defendant reasonably believed that the inten-
tional discrimination did not violate Title VII because he was
acting pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan3 8 or a bona
fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ").3 9 As discussed below,
the defense should not be applied so strictly. There should be
other occasions in which the defendant may be only negligent,
not reckless, or may believe incorrectly but in good faith, that
he was acting legally. 4 ° In all these cases, he should not be
punished by an award of punitive damages even though his
defense to liability would fail.
The Court, under the ADEA and § 1981, and Congress, under
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, could have required some aggra-
vating circumstances to impose exemplary damages, such as a
bad motive or a more outrageous act than intentionally discrim-
inating. The Court, however, has expressly declined to follow
135. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 964 (D.C. Cir 1998),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998) (in which the court said "[tihat Congress ulti-
mately enacted language similar to that employed by Smith v. Wade"); supra note 11.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
137. In the alternative, the defendant could be required to articulate a defense
which the plaintiff would then be required to disprove. "Punitive damages are damag-
es, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded .. . to punish [a defen-
dant] . . . and to deter him . . . from similar conduct in the future." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977). If the defendant intentionally discriminated, he
clearly deserves punishment in most cases because he has done a great social and
moral wrong proscribed by federal law. If, however, he was acting in good faith based
on reasonable grounds, he should not be assessed punitive damages.
138. See generally Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S.
616 (1987).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 212-17, 311-13. For a discussion of the
difference between recklessness and negligence, see infra note 298.
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this path under the ADEA and § 1981."' Similarly, Con-
gress intended that the same standard that applies to § 1981
would apply to 1991 Civil Rights Act.' In addition, because
Congress used virtually the same language as the Court used
in the ADEA cases and in Smith v. Wade, it is impossible to
argue rationally that Congress intended "reckless indifference"
to mean something different."4 Furthermore, the presence of
"reckless indifference" as an alternative to "malice" in the stat-
ute is an indication that Congress intended the minimum stan-
dard to be something less than conduct more egregious than
intentional discrimination.
After the 1991 Civil Rights Act made damages for race and
national origin cases under Title VII contingent on not being
able to recover under § 1981, § 1981 cases are generally con-
solidated with Title VII cases. The courts are still trying to
distinguish the standard for liability for intentional dis-
crimination under these two acts, as well as the ADA, from the
now unified standard for punitive damages. 45 Under the
ADEA, however, the Supreme Court has articulated a workable
and sensible interpretation of "reckless indifference," and courts
are generally following it. 46 The answer must, therefore, lie in
that direction. Before discussing the ADEA standard for liqui-
dated damages, which is my suggested solution, I will first
discuss the recent cases on punitive damages decided under
Title VII and § 1981, as well as the ADA, to illuminate the
problem.
141. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
142. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
143. There is some conflict in the legislative history, but it is clear that Congress
intended that the standard for Title VII should be the same as the standard that
governed § 1981. See, e.g., Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927 (5th
Cir. 1996).
144. See, e.g., Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.2d 958, 963 (D.C. Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998).
145. See id.
146. See infra Part IV.D.
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B. Recent Decisions Interpreting the Standard for Punitive
Damages Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act and § 1981
1. Generally
a. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n
I cited in my earlier article the few lower court cases that
had interpreted the standard for punitive damages under Title
VII at that time, as well as cases decided under § 1981.'4
These cases foreshadowed the nearly uniform difficulty courts
are having in interpreting the standard for punitive damages
under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, both in Title VII and ADA
cases. The confusion in the lower courts has continued, has
reached the courts of appeal, and has captured the attention of
the Supreme Court. The Court recently granted certiorari in
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n,'4 an en banc opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
In the panel opinion of the Kolstad case,"' the defendant
argued that legislative history indicated that punitive damages
under Title VII are available "only in 'extraordinarily egregious
cases,"""0 while the plaintiff argued that other contrary legis-
lative history said that "' [p]unitive damages are available under
[§ 1981a] to the same extent and under the same standards
that they are available to plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. §
1981.' ' The panel said that "[d]ecisive to us, however, is sec-
tion 1981a's plain language, which tracks the standard that
courts had previously established for the proof required to sus-
tain awards of punitive damages under other federal civil rights
147. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at Parts III.C.2., flI.D. The
article included cases decided through 1993. The courts that discussed the standard
for punitive damages under Title VII by 1994 generally were predicting what the
standard should be, were acting on motions for summary judgment, or were deciding
that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was not retroactive. See id. at Part III.D. The Su-
preme Court eventually decided that the damages provision of the Act was not retro-
active. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 289 (1994).
148. 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998).
149. 108 F.3d 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated in part, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998).
150. Id. at 1437 (citing 137 CoNG. REC. S15,473 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)).
151. Id. (citing 137 CONG. REC. 119527 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991)).
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statutes."'52 The court cited the rule in Smith v. Wade, recog-
nizing that "'evidence that suffices to establish an intentional
violation of protected civil rights also may suffice to permit the
jury to award punitive damages, provided that the jury, in its
"discretionary moral judgment," finds that the conduct merits a
punitive award.""53 The court continued, "'no additional evi-
dence is required,' because 'the state of mind necessary to trig-
ger liability for the wrong is at least as culpable as that re-
quired to make punitive damages applicable. '""54 The court
further indicated that punitive damages are not appropriate in
every Title VII case and cited as an example of such a situation
one in which the defendant defends on the ground that the em-
ployer erroneously believed that bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation or affirmative action justified the discrimination.'55
Unfortunately, the court en banc vacated the panel opinion,
required a showing of egregiousness for punitive damages under
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, and decided that the defendant had
not acted egregiously.'56 The court reached its decision in part
by misinterpreting Smith v. Wade to require egregious conduct
in addition to the conduct needed for liability to support puni-
tive damages. The court also cited legislative history that indi-
cated that "punitive damages [would] be available only in 'ex-
traordinarily egregious cases.""57 A strong dissent decried the
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1438 (emphasis in original) (quoting Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270,
1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983))); see also
Greenwell v. Raytheon Aerospace, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-2138, 1996 WL 709422, at *3
(E.D. La. Dec. 6, 1996).
154. Id. (quoting Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 (1st Cir.
1987)). See Adams v. Pinole Point Steel Co., Nos. C92-1962 MHP, C93-3708 MHP,
1995 WL 73088, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 1995), in which the court cited the stan-
dard for punitive damages under both § 1981 and Title VII as follows: "punitive
damages are available under both section 1981 and section 1983 upon a showing of
intentional violation of federal law.'" Id. at *4 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
56 (1983)).
155. See Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1438.
156. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998).
157. Id. at 962 (quoting 137 CONG. REC. S15,473 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)). The
case involved discriminatory failure to promote on the basis of sex. The evidence
showed that a less qualified man was preselected and that the employer attempted to
cover up the preselection. The person responsible for the preselection allegedly told
sexually offensive jokes at staff meetings and made derogatory references to women.
Evidence also indicated that the employer changed its explanation for failing to select
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majority's misinterpretation of Smith v. Wade, which plainly
does not require conduct more egregious than an intentional
violation of the law. The dissent recommended the same solu-
tion proposed in this article. The dissent also noted that the
problem with the majority's approach is that it offers no guid-
ance for determining what conduct is sufficiently egregious to
qualify for punitive damages.'58 For example, in the Kolstad
case, the dissent said that the majority seemed to relate egre-
giousness to three different criteria. At one point, egregiousness
seemed to be related to how severe the discriminatory conduct
was,'59 which is particularly subjective. At another point, the
majority seemed to relate egregiousness to the strength of the
plaintiffs evidence of discrimination." ° Finally, egregiousness
was related to whether the plaintiff had shown more than mere
pretext. 6' The dissent concluded that "[gliven the clarity of
section 1981a's text, we should follow the statue rather than
the selective bits of its confused legislative history."'62 The Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari in Kolstad which should
resolve whether there will be a consistent approach to a stan-
dard for exemplary damages under the four principal anti-dis-
crimination acts and what that standard will be.
b. Other Courts
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the problem is as instructive
as the Kolstad majority opinion, but even more anomalous. In
Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 6' the court thoughtfully pe-
the plaintiff. See id. at 978-79. The court decided that this conduct was not sufficient-
ly egregious to warrant a remand. See id. at 970.
158. See id. at 976 (Latel, J., dissenting).
159. See id.
160. See id. at 977.
161. See id. at 977-78.
162. Id. at 975.
163. 140 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1998), amended on petition for reh'g, 156 F.3d 988
(9th Cir. 1998). The court said that the defendant acted negligently or even recklessly
in determining whether the plaintiff was eligible for leave, but did not "evince an evil
motive or a conscious and deliberate disregard" for the plaintiffs rights. Id. at 1305.
Rather, the discriminatory decision to treat the Asian-American plaintiff differently
from a white person was based on miscommunication between managers. On petition
for rehearing, the court amended the opinion to include a reference to the Kolstad en
banc opinion. The court also changed its reference to the number of circuit courts
that require more than intentional discrimination from four to five. See Ngo, 156 F.3d
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rused the law to determine what standard it should apply for
punitive damages. The court noted that "section 1981a tracks
the standard for punitive damages established by the courts
under other civil rights statutes, most notably 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 1983"'" and that the legislative history indicated
that the language of the 1991 Act was directly derived from
that law. It also acknowledged that Smith v. Wade was the
authoritative interpretation of the standard, and that case re-
jected the argument that the standard for punitive damages
must necessarily be higher than the standard for liability. The
court noted, however, that many courts had, nevertheless, inter-
preted Smith v. Wade to require a heightened evidentiary show-
ing for punitive damages. The court, then, decided that it was
these lower court's "interpretation" of Smith v. Wade that Con-
gress intended to adopt in § 1981a. 6 ' The court decided that
to recover punitive damages, "the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant 'almost certainly knew that what he was
doing was wrongful and subject to punishment.'""'66
Many courts also rely on the legislative history of the 1991
Civil Rights Act to require a heightened standard of proof, but
they are unable to articulate exactly what the additional proof
should entail. For example, in Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc.,
167
the Fourth Circuit quoted legislative history to the effect that
"[pilaintiffs must first prove intentional discrimination, then
must prove actual injury or loss arising therefrom to recover
compensatory damages, and must meet an even higher standard
(establishing that the employer acted with malice or reckless or
callous indifference to their rights) to recover punitive damag-
es.,"68
at 988.
164. 140 F.3d at 1301.
165. See id. at 1301-03.
166. Id. at 1304 (quoting Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir.
1985)). In the Ngo case, the court unwittingly required that the defendant act "know-
ingly," a more culpable state of mind than mere recklessness. An actor acts recklessly
if he "consciously disregards a substantial risk," that the prohibited result will occur.
See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 537. He acts knowingly when he is
"aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause" the prohibited result. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985). For an explanation of the use of the criminal law mod-
el, see supra note 127.
167. 132 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997).
168. Id. at 983 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 72 (1991)).
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The legislative history of the Act ostensibly contradicts itself,
however, by also providing that the standard for punitive dam-
ages should be the same for Title VII and for § 1981, the stan-
dard for which is controlled by Smith v. Wade,'69 which does
not require more evidence or a heightened standard. As dis-
cussed above, the standard must be determined to be the same.
It should be noted, however, that legislative comments that de-
scribe the standard for punitive damages as "higher" than the
standard for liability are not necessarily inconsistent with re-
quiring that the defendant acted with a good faith reasonable
belief that it was not discriminating. Many courts, however,
assume that there is a conflict in the legislative history in this
regard.
The Second Circuit acknowledged this conflict in the legisla-
tive history and resolved it with reference to the language of
the statute that does not reflect a heightened standard but
rather follows the standard in other civil rights cases. 70 The
court also refused to approve a heightened standard to award
the maximum amount of punitive damages. 7'
Deciding that the standard should be same for § 1981 and for
the 1991 Civil Rights Act is simply the first step in the analy-
sis. The next step is to recognize what that standard is and
how to apply it. Other than the cases discussed above, most of
the courts, although holding that the standard is the same for §
1981 and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, have not interpreted the
standard, but have simply decided whether the defendant's
conduct was reckless or not.' 2
169. See supra text accompanying notes 98-108.
170. See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 220 (2d Cir. 1997).
171. See id. at 221.
172. For example, in Anderson v. Martin Brower Co., No. 93-2333-SWL, 1994 WL
377115, at *1 (D. Kan. June 9, 1994), the court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages because there was evidence that
the defendant knew that it could not discharge the plaintiff for his alcoholism. See id.
at *3, *6. The defendant was aware that the plaintiff was absent from work to try to
solve his problem and "the close proximity in time between defendant's awareness of
plaintiffs disability and his termination" was sufficient to indicate reckless indiffer-
ence. Id. at *6.
In an ADA case, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.
Ill. 1993), affd in part and rev'd in part, 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995), the court said
that the defendant's conduct was egregious and outrageous. See id. at 578. The presi-
dent who fired the plaintiff because of his disability lacked remorse which made fu-
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In Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Indiana, Inc.,1 7 3
for example, the court stated that "[p]unitive damages are prop-
er only on a showing of 'evil motive or intent, or ... reckless
or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of oth-
ers.""' 74 The defendant argued that this interpretation of the
standard for punitive damages is tantamount to an automatic
imposition of punitive damages whenever the court finds inten-
tional discrimination. The court responded that "[plunitive dam-
ages are never awarded as a matter of right; the finder of fact,
after reviewing the entire record, is called upon to make a
'moral judgment' that the unlawful conduct warrants such an
award to punish the wrongdoer and deter others."'75 In this
case, it found that the defendant's "attempt to deceive the
court, by presenting false reasons for its decision to discharge
Merriweather [the plaintiffl, was sufficiently serious that it
warranted imposition of punitive damages."1 76 Thus, the court
required an after-the-fact aggravating circumstance to justify
punitive damages; but whether the court would have affirmed
the award of punitive damages in the absence of such evidence
is not clear.'77
ture violations likely. Furthermore, firing a loyal employee who could perform the job
because he has only a short time to live "reflected a reckless indifference to his
rights and a callous insensitivity to his human condition." Id.
In another district court case, the court denied the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of punitive damages because the plaintiff received posi-
tive evaluations prior to his request for accommodation. The court said that a rea-
sonable jury could infer malice from the defendant's subsequent complaints about the
plaintiffs performance. See Stone v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 261, 266
(E.D. La. 1996).
In pre-trial motions in another case, the court said that an award of punitive
damages, though only remotely possible, could not be ruled out in a case in which
the defendant allegedly refused to interview the plaintiff because he was on crutches.
Koblosh v. Adelsick, No. 95C 5209, 1997 WL 311956, at *2 (N.D. I. June 5, 1997).
173. 103 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1996); see McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No.
3:95CV964, 1997 WL 328638, at *1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 12, 1997). In McKnight, the court
said that the standard required "malice or reckless indifference," not "reprehensible,
wanton, malicious or bad faith conduct." Id. at *4. The jury was justified in finding
this standard met by the employer's failure to remedy complaints of racial discrimina-
tion and its excessively subjective promotion practices. See id. at *5.
174. 103 F.3d at 581 (omissions in original) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
56 (1983)).
175. Id. at 582 (citing Smith, 461 U.S. at 52).
176. Id.
177. In another Seventh Circuit case, the court found that to establish liability, the
plaintiff only has to show that the defendant intentionally discriminated; however, the
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Some courts use state law standards to assess punitive dam-
ages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, ignoring the federal stat-
utory standard altogether. For example, in Harper v. B.P. Ex-
ploration & Oil, Inc.," the court said that because
racial discrimination, by definition, is willful and involves
disregard for the victim's civil rights, it is difficult to
imagine a case of racial discrimination that does not fit the
district court's description [that the defendant showed reck-
less disregard for the plaintiffs rights because its discrim-
inatory behavior was "willful and intentional"]. Therefore,
the district court's analysis leads to the conclusion that
punitive damages should always be awarded in discrimina-
tion cases, a conclusion that is contrary to the law....
Since a faulty conclusion implies a faulty premise, wilful-
ness and reckless disregard provide insufficient grounds on
which to base a punitive damage award."9
The court, nevertheless, affirmed the award of punitive damag-
es, based on a nine factor test borrowed from a state court
case. Two of the factors served as the basis for the award: the
duration of the defendant's misconduct, which had lasted sever-
standard for punitive damages, "malice or reckless indifference to the plaintiffs
rights," is a higher hurdle. See Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d
627, 636 (7th Cir. 1996). In the Emmel case, the court also found that the maximum
amount of punitive damages was appropriate because the violation was egregious.
Evidence established that the defendant had a policy of not promoting women into
higher management positions. See id. at 636-37; see also Hennessy v. Penril
Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995).
In Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D. Ind. 1996), the court
said that the standard for punitive damages required more than proof of the underly-
ing unlawful discrimination. See id. at 1475. In addition, the court said that the
amount of punitive damages would be determined by the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct. See id. at 1477. Hounding the plaintiff out of the company by
unreasonable work assignments was sufficiently egregious to support the maximum
award. See id. at 1476-78.
In another case, the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of punitive damages
because the defendant terminated the plaintiffs employment in the sincere belief that
the plaintiff had intentionally made false accusations against her supervisors. The
court said this finding precluded a finding that the defendant was acting in reckless
disregard of the plaintiffs rights. See Ortiz v. John 0. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121,
1126-27 (7th Cir. 1996).
178. 134 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision).(text available on
Westlaw, Nos. 96-5854, 96-5919, 1998 WL 45487, at *1).
179. Harper, 1998 WL 45487, at *5 (emphasis added).
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al years, and the fact that the defendant had been assessed
punitive damages in a prior discrimination case. 8°
The Eighth Circuit has also followed a test adopted from
state law. In Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 1' man-
agement ignored the plaintiffs complaints that an employee
had sexually assaulted her."2 Although the court decided that
the company was on notice of the incidents and failed to reme-
dy them, the defendant did not act with "reckless disregard" of
the plaintiffs rights. The court said that the plaintiff must
prove that the company acted with "malice or deliberate indif-
ference or that its conduct was outrageous." 83
Other courts cite no authority for their requirement of a
heightened standard. In the Sixth Circuit, the court has refused
to affirm an award of punitive damages, without discussion,
upon a showing that the plaintiff was discharged because she
contemplated having an abortion." "[A]lthough the actions of
[the defendant] were duplicitous and disclosed a lack of empa-
thy, they did not rise to the level to support a punitive damag-
es award under the Civil Rights Act of 1991."'
180. See id. at *6 (citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901-02
(Tenn. 1992)).
181. 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996).
182. See id. at 1211 (stating that an employee had grabbed the plaintiffs breasts
on two occasions).
183. Id. at 1214 (court mistakenly relied on an earlier case, Kientzy v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1993), where the court affirmed an award of
punitive damages under Missouri law in a case brought under both Title VII and
Missouri law); accord Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Mo., Inc., 139 F.3d 631,
636-37 (8th Cir. 1998); Karcher v. Emerson Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that, despite the defendant's retaliatory actions and its intentionally
setting qualifications to eliminate women, such actions were insufficient for the award
of punitive damages under Title VII or under state law and that punitive damages
could only be awarded under state law for conduct that would "'shock the conscience
and cause outrage" (quoting Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1216
(6th Cir. 1996))); see also Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 1998)
(stating that punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 require more than
intentional discrimination, but finding the requisite reckless disregard in the
supervisor's inappropriate conduct which continued for years and was ignored by the
manager); Hogue v. MQS Inspection, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 714, 725 (D. Colo. 1995)
(stating that, because reckless indifference is not defined in the ADA, it would be in-
formed by the federal standard for violations of civil rights, and that the defendant's
conduct was "not so egregious or shocking so as to allow assessment of punitive dam-
ages").
184. See, e.g., Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996).
185. Id. at 1216 (6th Cir. 1996). The defendant had lied about the reason for the
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Regardless of the source of authority, most courts that re-
quire additional proof demand some "egregious" conduct on the
part of the defendant.' a What "egregious" means other than
intentionally discriminating against the plaintiff is left to imagi-
nation and becomes like obscenity: the court will know it when
discharge and had "padded" the plaintif's file to support a manufactured reason. See
id. at 1214-15.
The Tenth Circuit said that the "defendant's acts need not have been 'extraor-
dinarily egregious' to support a finding of punitive damages. Adakai v. Front Row
Seat, Inc., 125 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (text available
on Westlaw, No. 96-2249, 1997 WL 603458, at *2) (quoting Luciano v. Olsten Corp.,
110 F.3d 210, 220 (2d Cir. 1997)). For a discussion of the case, see infra text accom-
panying notes 202-04.
In McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498 (1st Cir. 1996), the First
Circuit determined that the lower court refused to award punitive damages based on
the district court's decision that the defendants' sexual harassment was offensive, and
the district court's statement that "[in fact, in many cases, this behavior might be
strong evidence of malice or, at least, reckless indifference to Plaintiffs' rights. In this
case, however, the Court believes that, the behavior of at least some Defendants was
influenced by language, cultural, and educational barriers." Id. at 507-08. The court of
appeals remanded the case to the district court to specify other evidence, if any, that
made punitive damages inappropriate. See id. at 509. The First Circuit concluded
that "heavy reliance on cultural and educational factors [was] inappropriate ....
Ignorance of the law or of local custom is not a defense." Id. However, despite the
fact that the defendants' conduct was patently offensive and repeated, punitive dam-
ages are never awarded as of right, but only "'to punish [the defendant] for his outra-
geous conduct and deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.'"
Id. at 508 (quoting Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 (1st Cir. 1987)
(alteration in original)).
186. For example, in Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742 (4th Cir.
1998), the court, addressing a § 1981 case, found that -[a]lthough any form of dis-
crimination constitutes reprehensible and abhorrent conduct, not every lawsuit under
§ 1981 calls for submission of this extraordinary remedy to a jury.' In our view, there
is simply insufficient evidence in the record to conclude that [the defendant's] conduct
toward [the plaintiffs] was so egregious that it was appropriate to submit the issue of
punitive damages to the jury." Id. at 766 (quoting Stephens v. South Atlantic Can-
ners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 489-90 (4th Cir. 1988)).
In Coffman v. Tracker Marine, L.P., 141 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir. 1998), the court
determined that the employer could not be assessed punitive damages because it
"attempted to solve what it perceived to be the problem." Id. at 1248. In EEOC v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (D.N.M. 1998), the employer had a na-
tionwide interview form that asked about medical conditions. The defendant did not
change the form for some months after it became subject to the provisions of the
ADA. The defendant's argument was that this was negligent on its part but not reck-
less. The jury was instructed that if it believed that the question was asked because
the defendant was recklessly indifferent to the plaintiffs rights under the ADA, puni-
tive damages were appropriate. See id. at 1325. The court held that there was
enough evidence, in addition to neglecting to change the form, such as failing to train
its interviewers about the ADA, to support the jury's verdict. See id at 1326.
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it sees it.' The problem is that there is no way to describe
egregious conduct to the jury so that the jury will know it
when it sees it.
Some courts even index the amount of egregiousness to the
amount of the award. For example, in Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,188 the Fourth Circuit held that the award of punitive
damages was appropriate because the defendant acted with
callous indifference to the plaintiffs rights under the ADA by
demoting him during his medical leave without making any
effort to inquire into his condition.'89 The court, nevertheless,
determined that the award of $182,000 in punitive damages
was excessive and, therefore, reduced it to $50,000. The court
noted that, although the defendant's actions were "sufficiently
egregious" to justify a punitive damages award, when "[tiaking
into consideration the harm suffered by [the plaintiff]; the de-
gree of [the defendant's] indifference towards [the plaintiffs]
rights under the ADA; and the policy judgments inherent in
any" punitive damages award, $182,000 was superfluous. 9 '
In another Fourth Circuit case, the court said that
[p]unitive damages may be warranted in discrimination
cases when the employer (or its agent) deliberately deceives
the court by consciously misrepresenting its true motives for
an employment decision .... [The supervisor's] systematic
and continuous deceit, including his orchestrated cover-up of
his racist motivations and the jury's obvious rejection of his
testimony as false, revealed [the supervisor's] truly cavalier
disregard for [the plaintiffs] federal right to be free from
race discrimination.'91
Finally, some courts base the decision of whether punitive
damages are appropriate on the defendant's conduct toward the
employee after the discriminatory act. For example, courts have
187. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring).
188. 144 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1998).
189. See id. at 306.
190. Id. at 306-07.
191. Cooper v. Paychex, Inc., Nos. 97-1645, 97-1543, 97-1720, 1998 WL 637274, at
*12 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1998); see also EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 989,
993 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that punitive damages were appropriate because the jury
could have found that the defendant attempted to cover up the fact that it had failed
to hire the plaintiff because she was pregnant).
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considered the defendant's attempt "to solve what it perceived
to be the problem,"'92 or the defendant's failure to remedy the
problem in deciding whether or not punitive damages are ap-
propriate.'93
Courts are not in agreement on the standard for punitive
damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act and § 1981. Agree-
ment regarding the standard is not the only problem, however.
The question that arises is who has to be recklessly indifferent
for the jury to award punitive damages against the company.
2. The Employer's Liability for Punitive Damages for Acts of
Supervisors
The standard for punitive damages is further complicated by
the fact that the act of discrimination is rarely carried out by
the employer but rather by an agent of the employer, commonly
a supervisor.' If the employer is liable for compensatory
damages for the supervisor's intentional discrimination, there is
no statutory basis for not attributing to the employer the
supervisor's reckless indifference to the plaintiffs federally
protected rights. Several courts, however, have refused to im-
pute punitive damages to the employer for a supervisor's reck-
less indifference.
This additional confusion has been especially pronounced in
sexual harassment cases in which courts may be willing to hold
the company liable for the intentional discrimination of its
supervisors, but not its supervisor's reckless disregard of the
plaintiffs rights.'95  For example, in Splunge v. Shoney's,
192. Coffinan v. Tracker Marine, L.P., 141 F.3d 1241, 1248 (8th Cir. 1998).
193. See Feltner v. Title Search Co., Nos. 97-1087, 97-3413, 1998 WL 636773, at
*1 (7th Cir. Sept. 2, 1998) (ruling that punitive damages are appropriate in a case in
which the company did nothing to stop the sexual harassment).
194. Even the panel of the D.C. Circuit that decided the only case under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and that adopted the view this article proposes, stated that puni-
tive damages against an employer may not be appropriate in a case where the "dis-
crimination occurs outside the scope of the agency relationship between employer and
employee-in a hostile environment case." Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d
1431, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated en banc on other grounds, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C.
Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998).
195. Some courts require complicity by higher company officials. For example, in
Burrell v. Crown Central Petroleum, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 376 (E.D. Tex. 1997), the court
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Inc.,'96 the court decided that punitive damages were inappro-
priate even though all of the supervisory personnel in the res-
taurant engaged in such blatant sexual harassment that the
defendant did not even contest the existence of a hostile envi-
ronment.'97 The court further decided that a reasonable jury
could have found the company's sexual harassment policy was
never communicated to the plaintiffs,' and that the hostile
environment was so pervasive that higher management should
have known about it. This was enough to establish the
company's liability for compensatory damages. 9 With regard
to punitive damages, however, the court reversed the award of
punitive damages, saying that, although the plaintiffs had com-
plained to the area supervisor, they had never complained to
"higher management," so the company did not act with reckless
indifference to the plaintiffs' rights.
200
In several other cases, the courts have said that the "requi-
site level of recklessness or outrageousness can be inferred from
management's participation in the discriminatory conduct."
20
'
held that to recover punitive damages, the plaintiffs would "have to show that the
company itself engaged in discriminatory conduct reaching the level of maliciousness
or discriminatory conduct, or at least that the company knew about such conduct and
authorized, ratified, or approved it." Id. at 386. In another case of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment, the court dismissed the punitive damages claim because se-
nior officials responded to the plaintiffs complaint, albeit belatedly, by "talking" to
the alleged harasser. See Ayers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1163, 1170
(M.D. Fla. 1996).
196. 97 F.3d 488 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Reynolds v. CSX Transp., Inc., 115 F.3d
860 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998). In the Reynolds
case, the only person who acted with malice or reckless disregard was the supervisor
who harassed the plaintiff. Because he was not considered a member of upper man-
agement, the company was not liable for punitive damages. The company showed that
it took the plaintiffs complaints seriously, posted its anti-harassment policy, repri-
manded the supervisor, and remedied the discrimination against the plaintiff. See id.
at 869. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Reynolds and remanded in light
of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). See Reynolds v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998).
197. Supervisory employees "grabbed Plaintiffs, commented extensively on their
physical attributes, showed them pornographic photos and videotapes, offered them
money for sex, favored other employees who had affairs with them, speculated as to
the plaintiffs' sexual prowess, and so on." Splunge, 97 F.3d at 489.
198. See id. at 490.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 575 (8th Cir. 1997); see also
Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1066 (8th Cir. 1997).
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For example, in Adakai v. Front Row Seat, Inc.,2"2 the owner
referred to the plaintiff several times as a "long-haired, scuzzy
Navajo guy,"' and told the plaintiffs supervisor to "'get rid of
that goddamned Indian.'"'2 3 The court found this evidence was
sufficient to show malice or reckless indifference of the
plaintiffs federally protected rights."4
To require that the highest company officials must be in-
volved in the discrimination or must be reckless in order to
assess punitive damages creates a substantial loophole that
Congress likely did not intend. At the time of the enactment of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the courts were virtually unanimous
in holding that an employer was strictly liable for the
supervisor's actions in a case involving tangible employment
actions, such as hiring and discharge.2 5
Courts that limit the employer's liability for punitive damag-
es usually cite as their authority Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B.
v. Vinson,"'5 in which the Supreme Court declined "to issue a
definitive rule on employer liability," but directed the courts to
general agency principles." 7 The Supreme Court's recent deci-
202. No. 96-2249, 1997 WL 603458, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997).
203. Id. at *3.
204. See id. The Fourth Circuit requires a heightened showing for punitive damag-
es, not only of the harasser, but also of the employer. See Harris v. L & L Wings,
Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 983 (4th Cir. 1997). The Harris court articulated a three-part test
to evaluate the "sufficiency of the evidence on the malice or reckless indifference of
employers . . . (1) evidence of the employer's attitude towards sexual harassment
[which may include the promulgation of an anti-harassment policy]; (2) direct state-
ments by the employer about plaintiffs' rights or complaints; and (3) the egregious-
ness of the conduct at issue." Id. In this case, the employer had no anti-harassment
policy and had disavowed his responsibility to rid his workforce of sexual harassment.
Furthermore, the conduct complained of was daily and pervasive sexual harassment
of both physical and verbal nature. See id. at 984.
In a Fifth Circuit case, the court rejected the plaintiffs cross-appeal challenging
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which reversed the jury's punitive damages
award. See Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1996). The
Fifth Circuit ruled that a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant knew
or should have known of the sexual harassment directed at the plaintiff by her su-
pervisor, but that "no reasonable juror could conclude that Horizon [the defendant]
itself acted with malice or with reckless indifference." Id. at 810. The plaintiff com-
plained to the human resources director about her supervisor's comments regarding
her personal life on several occasions. The director took no action. "Further, under
the particular facts of this case, no applicable tool of agency law would justify impos-
ing punitive damages on Horizon based on [the supervisor's] conduct." Id.
205. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264-65 (1998).
206. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
207. Id. at 72. The Court added the caveat that
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sions refining Meritor should change rulings limiting employer
liability for punitive damages and, in addition, may provide
some guidance for a possible resolution of the interpretation of
the standard for punitive damages."8
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,°9 the Court clari-
fied Meritor and held that Congress intended to reference su-
pervisory liability to general agency law.21° Using the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency, the Court decided that, because the
supervisor is aided in the conduct by the agency relationship,
the employer is vicariously liable in cases in which sexual ha-
rassment results in a tangible job consequence. In cases in
which there is no tangible job consequence, termed hostile envi-
ronment cases, the employer is similarly vicariously liable for
sexual harassment under the same theory but has an affirma-
tive defense. The employer can avoid liability by showing that
"(a) [it] exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid the harm otherwise."21'
such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particu-
lars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any
"agent" of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to
place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under
Title VII are to be held responsible.
Id. The Court noted that the EEOC's view was
where a supervisor exercises the authority actually delegated to him by
his employer, by making or threatening to make decisions affecting the
employment status of his subordinates, such actions are properly imputed
to the employer whose delegation of authority empowered the supervisor
to undertake them. Thus, the courts have consistently held employers
liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory per-
sonnel, whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or ap-
proved of the supervisor's actions.
Id. at 70-71 (citations omitted). The Court then turned to the EEOC's suggestion that
these principles should not apply in a hostile environment case. See id. at 71.
208. See, e.g., Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th
Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit in Deffenbaugh-Williams revised its earlier interpretation
of employer liability for punitive damages to conform to the Supreme Court's decision
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264-65 (1998).
209. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
210. See id. at 2269-70. The Court decided a companion case and applied the same
standard. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998).
211. Ellerth, 118 Ct. at 2270.
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There is no reason to apply a different rule to the imposition
of punitive damages on the employer in general.212 In addi-
tion, Ellerth provides guidance for an additional affirmative
defense for employers to use in extenuating circumstances. As
the dissent in Kolstad suggested, employers who are usually
strictly liable for the acts of their supervisors for compensatory
damages purposes could possibly have a defense to punitive
damages if they made good faith efforts to train supervisors not
to discriminate.213
212. In one recent case that involved only a § 1981 claim, the Tenth Circuit adopt-
ed the Restatement (Second) of Torts test for whether an employer is liable for puni-
tive damages for the acts of its supervisors:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other
principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and manner
of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or managerial agent was reck-
less in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in
the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved
the act.
Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1977)). This cause of action arose
prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
At least one race discrimination case, decided before Ellerth, relied on Meritor
to deny punitive damages. In Patterson v. P.H.P Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927 (5th
Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit reversed the award of punitive damages based on
Meritor. See id. at 943. The difference between this case and other cases citing
Meritor as justification for denying punitive damages is that Patterson was not a
hostile environment sexual harassment case but rather a race discrimination and
retaliation case involving tangible employment consequences brought under § 1981
and Title VII. The court held the employer liable for compensatory damages for the
intentional race discrimination committed by its project manager, Kennedy. The court
found that punitive damages may only be assessed against a defendant who has been
malicious or reckless. See id. at 944. The project manager, however, was not a corpo-
rate officer, and there was no other evidence that the company "had knowledge of
Kennedy's malicious or reckless conduct, or authorized, ratified, or approved
Kennedy's actions." Id. Furthermore, the company had a policy of non-discrimination
and a procedure for filing complaints which the plaintiffs did not utilize. See id. The
Fifth Circuit revised its view of employer liability after the Supreme Court's decision
in Ellerth. See supra note 208.
213. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998). It should be noted that in situations other than
hostile environment discrimination, the defense would not work unless the plaintiff is
in a better position than the employer to know that she is being discriminated
against and fails to take advantage of appropriate procedures for notifying the em-
ployer.
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For example, although the court did not specifically address
company liability, in Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co.,214 the
court affirmed an award of punitive damages based on the
company's failure to provide anti-discrimination training to its
supervisors who used racial epithets when referring to the
plaintiff.2"5 The court said that this may not have been evi-
dence of malice, but it was at least evidence that the employer
was recklessly indifferent to the plaintiffs rights."6 Presum-
ably, if the company could have convinced the court that it had
in fact trained the supervisors, it could have avoided liability in
this case.
Courts, then, have further limited the availability of punitive
damages by requiring not only reckless indifference on the part
of supervisor involved but also some sort of direct complicity by
high management officials.2"7 This makes punitive damages
214. 130 F.3d 349 (8th Cir. 1997).
215. See id. at 358.
216. See id. The court quoted the proper standard under federal law, "'malice or
reckless indifference,' but failed to analyze it separately. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(1) (1994)).
217. In addition, some courts have created yet another obstacle to the recovery of
punitive damages, applying BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996),
to Title VII cases to require an even higher standard of disreputable behavior.
In Patterson v. P.H.P Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth
Circuit turned to BMW of North America, in which the Supreme Court dealt with the
constitutional limits on punitive damages, to vacate and remand for reconsideration
an award of punitive damages in a case of admittedly egregious racism. See id. at
945. The court also parsed the record to reverse the award of compensatory damages.
"[Tihe record is replete with Kennedy's [the managerial employee responsible for the
discrimination] use of racial epithets and other actions demonstrating his reprehensi-
ble views on race relations." Id. at 942. With regard to one of the plaintiffs,
Patterson, Kennedy told her that she was not to hire "another nigger." Id. When she
did so, he terminated her and back-dated a document to support his story that she
was discharged for misconduct. See id. The other plaintiff, Brown, was assigned the
less desirable shift and menial tasks because of his race. See id. Although the lower
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kennedy had acted with "malice
and/or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights" of the plaintiffs, the
award was not justified under BMW of North America. Id. at 942-43. The court enu-
merated three factors in its decision: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct; (2) the disparity between the harm suffered and the damage
award; and (3) the difference between the damages awarded in this case and compa-
rable cases." Id. at 943. The court decided that an award of $150,000 did not meet
any of the three factors. See id.
Because the plaintiff, Brown, was not subjected personally to Kennedy's racist
comments, the only behavior that met the standard of malice and reckless indiffer-
ence was the intentional falsification of documents, which was insufficient to support
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the award in light of BMW of North America. See id. Furthermore, the award did not
bear a "reasonable relationship" to the compensatory damage award of $22,648, which
would be reduced on remand. See id. Finally, the largest punitive damage award for
a similar case was $50,000. With regard to the award against Kennedy personally,
the court reversed the award in favor of the plaintiff Patterson, who only had a Title
VII claim under which no individual liability attached. See id. at 945. Because the
Fifth Circuit has revised its view of employer liability, the decision, if made today,
would be somewhat different based on the court's decision in Deffenbaugh-Williams v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998). See supra notes 212-13.
In Deffenbaugh itself, however, the court reduced the amount of punitive dam-
ages based on BMW of North America because even though the employer's conduct
was malicious, it was not sufficiently "reprehensible." Deffenbaugh-Williams, 156 F.3d
at 598.
In Guess v. Pfizer, 971 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Pa. 1996), the court cited Smith v.
Wade for the proposition that "[plunitive damages are awarded to punish the defen-
dant for outrageous conduct and deter it and others like it from similar conduct in
the future," and the court held that the defendant's conduct justified punitive damag-
es. Id. at 176. The defendant complained that the air quality in the lab in which he
worked exacerbated his asthma. See id. at 168. In order to show that the air quality
was not a factor, the defendant commissioned an air quality study, assuring the de-
fendant that nothing would be found to be wrong. Before the test, the defendant had
the lab floor professionally cleaned and opened all the windows which were usually
kept closed. See id. at 176. The court then proceeded to remit the jury's award based
on BMW of North America, stating that the most important factor was how reprehen-
sible the defendant's conduct was and found that it was not sufficiently reprehensible
to justify the $150,000 award. See id. at 177. The court analyzed three factors ex-
tracted from BMW of North America: (1) degree of reprehensibility of defendant's con-
duct, (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered and the punitive
award, and (3) the difference between the award and the civil or criminal penalties
imposed in comparable cases. See id. at 177-79 (citing BMW of North America, 517
U.S. at 575). This case, then, put a further burden on the plaintiff to show that the
defendant's conduct was reprehensible, despite the language of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 and Smith v. Wade. The court said that in cases of similar awards, the
defendant's conduct was more reprehensible; here, there was no showing that the
defendant had ever discriminated against disabled people in the past or would do so
in the future. See id. at 178-79. Although there was little disparity between the
amount of the punitive damages and the compensatory damages, and the court had
insufficient information on whether other similar awards were comparable, the court,
nevertheless, decided that the award "shocked the conscience" and reduced it to
$17,500. See id. at 180.
In another case, the court pointed out with more clarity the difference between
a case of intentional discrimination and BMW of North America, which involved the
failure of the seller to inform the buyer that the car had been repainted. See
McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 3:95CV964, 1997 WL 328638, at *5-7 (E.D.
Va. Mar. 12, 1997).
In Hearn v. General Elec. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Ala. 1996), the court
cited BMW of North America for the proposition that the court should consider the
character and degree of the wrong. The court decided that the defendant acted with
reckless indifference in laying off and demoting the plaintiffs. In addition, the court
found that the defendant also acted with malice, defining it as intentionally doing "a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with an intent to injure the person or
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unlikely except in a very small business, the highest officials of
which are involved in the day-to-day work. This cannot be what
Congress intended as evidenced by the fact that at the time of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, there was no question but that em-
ployers were generally strictly liable for the acts of their
supervisors.21 The availability of punitive damages should not
change this as a general rule, but there should be room for
extenuating circumstances, as the Court recognized in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.219 In addition, the dam-
age caps of the 1991 Act are determined by the size of the
company, which indicates a Congressional intent that the com-
pany itself would be liable."'
Also, at the time of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress must
have been informed by the law that existed at the time which
used as a standard "reckless indifference to federal rights." The
ADEA is one of those and should inform the standard for the
1991 Civil Rights Act.
IV. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD FOR
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES UNDER THE ADEA
The ADEA provides that the "rights created by the Act are to
property of another person." Id. at 1500. The evidence of malice was the contemp-
tuous manner in which the supervisor told the plaintiffs of their respective demotion
and lay off. See id.
BMW of North America is inappropriate in a Title VII case because discrimina-
tion is reprehensible per se and because it is not clear that punitive damages cannot
be awarded in the absence of compensatory damages. See Shea v. Galaxie Lumber &
Constr. Co., 152 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir. 1998); Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating,
Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F.
Supp. 2d 1313, 1326 (D.N.M. 1998) (awarding punitive damages for asking a question
about an applicant's medical condition which is illegal under the ADA); Robertson v.
Bryn Mawr Hosp., No. Civ.A.94-2489, 1995 WL 375837, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 20,
1995) (stating that even in the absence of compensatory damages, punitive damages
are awardable as a matter of federal common law). The court in EEOC v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., decided that if compensatory damages were required to support punitive
damages in this case, the ADA's prohibition against asking about medical problems
would be rendered meaningless because there would rarely be a serious injury caused
by asking an illegal question. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
218. See generally Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
219. See id. at 2269-70; see also supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). For the full text of this provision, see
supra note 28.
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be 'enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and
procedures' of the Fair Labor Standards Act."2 ' The standard
for a willful violation was developed first under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), which may account for some of the
confusion in determining liquidated damages under the ADEA.
Under the FLSA, the defendant is strictly liable if he fails to
pay the requisite amount."' The defendant does not need bad
intent, unlike the ADEA, which may require that the defendant
intend to discriminate in order to be liable." Under the
FLSA, if the defendant does act with bad intent, he may be
guilty of a criminal violation if he acted willfully." Original-
ly, liquidated damages were automatically awarded upon a
finding of liability.2" The Portal-to-Portal Act amended the
liquidated damages provision and allowed the employer to avoid
such damages in the discretion of the court if the employer
showed that the "act or omission giving rise to such action was
in good faith and that [the employer] had reasonable grounds
for believing that his act or omission was not a violation" of the
Act. 6 The problem in applying the FLSA standard in a non-
FLSA statute is that when the underlying violation also re-
quires a bad intent, as in the case of an ADEA violation, osten-
sibly requiring a different and possibly less culpable intent for
the imposition of liquidated damages is confusing. The Court
first attempted to resolve the problem by articulating the stan-
dard for a willful violation of the ADEA in Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Thurston.227
221. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985) (citing
Lorrilard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579 (1978)).
222. See generally MARK A ROTHsTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 201-09 (1994).
223. See supra note 35.
224. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1994).
225. See id. § 216(b). Criminal penalties for the ADEA were rejected by the draft-
ers of the ADEA because of the increased burden of proof for criminal violations and
to avoid employers' frustrating the implementation of the ADEA by interposing their
privilege against self incrimination. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125 (quoting 113 CONG.
REc. 2199, 7076 (1967)).
226. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1994).
227. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
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A. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston
In Thurston, the Court reviewed the defendant's policy which
allowed airline pilots who were mandatorily retiring due to age
to transfer to flight engineer status. The transfer was possible
only if a vacancy in flight engineering existed.2" The policy
was ultimately found to violate the ADEA because pilots who
retired for reasons other than age were permitted to transfer to
flight engineer even if no vacancy existed.229 Once it concluded
that the employer was liable, the Court examined whether the
defendant had committed a willful violation of the ADEA.
The Court began by analyzing the relationship between the
FLSA and the ADEA. The Court observed that, although the
enforcement provisions of the FLSA were incorporated into the
ADEA, the provisions are not identical.230 The Court noted
that the FLSA has criminal penalties for a willful violation. For
a willful violation of the ADEA, the Act prescribes only liqui-
dated damages which Congress intended to be punitive. 1
[A]n employer is subject to criminal penalties under the
FLSA when he "wholly disregards the law . . . without
making any reasonable effort to determine whether the plan
he is following would constitute a violation of the law." This
standard is substantially in accord with the interpretation
.of 'willful' adopted by the Court of Appeals in interpreting
the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA. The court
below stated a violation of the Act was "willfu" if "the em-
ployer . . . knew or showed reckless disregard for the mat-
ter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the
ADEA.5
232
The Court rejected the plaintiffs proposal of guilt for a will-
ful violation if the defendant knew that the ADEA was "in the
picture." The Court said that
228. See id. at 116.
229. See id. at 121-22.
230. See id. at 125.
231. See id. (citing Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1994)). Congress rejected a proposal to add criminal penalties to the ADEA. See id.
(citing 113 CONG. REC. 2199, 7076 (1967)).
232. Id. at 126 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 33:41
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
[tihe "in the picture" standard would allow the recovery of
liquidated damages even if the employer acted reasonably
and in complete "good faith." Congress hardly intended such
a result. The Court interpreted the FLSA, as originally en-
acted, as allowing the recovery of liquidated damages any
time that there was a violation of the Act. In response to
its dissatisfaction with that harsh interpretation of the
provision, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947. [It] provides the employer with a defense to a manda-
tory award of liquidated damages when it can show good
faith and reasonable grounds for believing it was not in
violation of the FLSA. Section 7(b) of the ADEA does not
incorporate § 11 of the PPA [Portal-to-Portal Act]. Neverthe-
less, we think that the same concerns are reflected in the
proviso to § 7(b) of the ADEA.n
The Court further found that adopting the "in the picture"
standard would result in punitive damages in every case. Be-
cause covered employers are required by law to post ADEA
notices, they are universally aware of the ADEA. Consequently,
the ADEA is "in the picture" for all covered employers.2"
The Court adopted the standard articulated by the court of
appeals that a "violation is 'willful' if 'the employer either knew
or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its con-
duct was prohibited by the ADEA,"' 5 which would preserve
the two-tier standard intended by Congress."' The Court
found that the defendant in Thurston had acted reasonably and
in good faith because it consulted with legal counsel on the
matter and negotiated with the union before changing its poli-
cy, consequently the violation was not willful."7
233. Id. at 128 n.22 (citations omitted).
234. See id. at 127-28.
235. Id. at 128 (quoting Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713
F.2d 940, 956 (1983)). The Court said that this standard also comported with how
the Court had interpreted the term "willful" in other criminal and civil cases. See id.
at 127.
236. See id. at 127-28. The Court also rejected the employer's argument that will-
ful should mean that the employer intentionally violated the Act. See id. at 127.
237. See id. at 129.
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B. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.
Before the 1991 Civil Rights Act changed the statute of limi-
tations for the ADEA,2 3' a willful violation under the ADEA
had an additional implication. Under both the ADEA and the
FLSA, if the defendant engaged in a willful violation, the stat-
ute of limitations was extended from two to three years. The
lower courts were not sure whether the standard for measuring
willfulness for purposes of the statute of limitations should be
the same as the standard announced in Thurston.
In McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.,239 which arose under
the FLSA, the Court decided that the standard for a willful
violation should be the same as that announced in Thurston,
whether the employer "either knew or showed reckless disre-
gard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by
the statute."24 °
The Court said that the two-tiered statute of limitations
indicated Congress's intent to make a "significant distinction
between ordinary violations and willful violations.""4  The
Court again rejected the "in the picture" standard because it
would "obliterate [the] distinction."242
C. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins
In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,243 the Court reiterated again
that liquidated damages can be assessed only if "'the employer
either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the [ADEA]. '  The
Court noted that even after Thurston and McLaughlin, the
lower courts continued to be confused about the term "will-
238. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7(e), 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1994).
239. 486 U.S. 128 (1988).
240. Id. at 133. The Court also noted that the same statute of limitations applied
to the ADEA. See id. at 131.
241. Id. at 132.
242. Id. at 132-33. For a further discussion of the Thurston case, see infra text ac-
companying notes 285-87.
243. 507 U.S. 604, 615 (1993).
244. Id. at 615 (quoting McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 133).
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ful."245 In cases which did not involve a discriminatory policy,
courts generally declined to apply the "reckless disregard" stan-
dard. Some courts required direct evidence; others required that
age be the "predominate" reason for the action; one court re-
quired that the employer's conduct be outrageous.246
The Court in the Hazen Paper case identified the problem
accurately. "The chief concern of these Circuits has been that
the application of Thurston would defeat the two-tiered system
of liability intended by Congress, because every employer that
engages in informal age discrimination knows or recklessly
disregards the illegality of its conduct."247 The Court said that
this concern was misplaced. The ADEA requires a willful viola-
tion for the assessment of liquidated damages, and the two-
tiered liability principle was only one interpretive tool to use in
deciding the meaning of the term "willful." The Court said
"across the range of ADEA cases," the "knowledge or reckless
disregard" standard will still produce a two-tier liability
scheme.24
It is not true that an employer who knowingly relies on
age in reaching its decision invariably commits a knowing
or reckless violation of the ADEA. The ADEA is not an
unqualified prohibition on the use of age in employment
decisions, but affords the employer a "bona fide occupational
qualification" defense, and exempts certain subject matters
and persons. If an employer incorrectly but in good faith
and nonrecklessly believes that the statute permits a partic-
ular age-based decision, then liquidated damages should not
be imposed.249
In clarifying that the employer is not guilty of a willful viola-
tion if it shows that it acted in good faith on the reasonable
belief that it was not in violation of the Act, Hazen Paper has
provided the guidance the courts needed to distinguish between
willful and non-willful violations in ADEA cases.25
245. See id.; Henkel, supra note 95, at 1210-15 (discussing lower court opinions
after Thurston).
246. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 615 (citations omitted).
247. Id. at 615-16.
248. Id. at 616.
249. Id. (citations omitted).
250. See infra Part IV.D.
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D. Recent Lower Court Decisions Under the ADEA
Before Hazen Paper, the lower courts were unable to apply
the "reckless indifference" standard announced in Thurston.25'
As the Court in Hazen Paper noted, some courts required direct
evidence; others required that age be the "predominate" reason,
and one court required that the employer's conduct be outra-
geous.252 These inconsistencies are not unlike those that are
occurring now in Title VII cases. 3
After Hazen Paper, lower courts have been virtually unani-
mous in finding that the employer acted with "reckless indiffer-
ence," absent presentation of evidence of good faith reasonable
belief that the ADEA permitted the action. When the standard
is expressed in such terms, the courts have been able to apply
it. In Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hospital,254 for example, the
Fifth Circuit noted Hazen Paper's clarification of the standard.
The court said that "liquidated damages are not recoverable
only if there is evidence that the intentional violation of the
ADEA was based on the employer's good faith, albeit mistaken,
belief that the statute allowed an age-based decision."255
251. See supra text accompanying notes 245-47.
252. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 615 (citations omitted); Henkel, supra note 95,
at 1210-15 (discussing these lower court cases).
253. See discussion supra Part III.B.
254. 92 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 1996).
255. Id. at 256 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 129-30
(1985)); accord Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106 (5th Cir. 1995)
(where the evidence established that the defendant knew that age discrimination was
illegal but discharged someone for it anyway, without any colorable reason to believe
that the ADEA did not apply); Ray v. Iuka Special Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d
1246 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that, even if the defendant did not know that retalia-
tion violated the ADEA, the defendant's conduct was at least reckless; furthermore,
there was no showing that the defendant had a good faith belief that the ADEA
permitted the retaliation against the plaintiff for filing a charge); see also Sanchez v.
Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 722 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that under any standard
the defendant's actions "clearly fall outside the safe haven for good faith but incorrect
conduct"). The jury in Sanchez could have found that the failure to reinstate the
plaintiff was based on a deliberate strategy reflecting age discrimination. See id.; see
also Mulqueen v. Daka, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 86, 96 n.13 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The more
appropriate inquiry might be whether a finding of intentional violation by the jury
required a finding of willfulness as a matter of law. However, the plaintiff failed to
make a request or objection to the court's charge despite the defendant's now admit-
ted failure to raise a defense of good faith."); Curtis v. Robern, Inc., 819 F. Supp.
451, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding that the defendant did not act in good faith and
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In Woodhouse, an official admitted that he had been informed
"that age would be used as one factor in determining which
positions would be eliminated.""6 There was also evidence
that the reduction in force ("RIF") policy could be manipulated
so that older employees would be eliminated and that the policy
was not followed at all when the plaintiff was discharged."7
Thus, the court decided that the jury could have concluded that
the defendant acted willfully. Furthermore, the defendant "of-
fered no evidence that it reasonably believed in good faith that
the ADEA permitted an age-based decision on the selection of
positions for elimination."25
In Stewart v. City of Chicago,259 the city attempted to inter-
pose such a defense. The city broadened the class of firefighters
in order to retire more people mandatorily under the limited
exemption to the ADEA's prohibition against mandatory retire-
ment.26 The court granted summary judgment, determining
that the defendant had discriminated based on age by applying
the broader exemption which violated the ADEA.26' The court
also granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of
liquidated damages, citing Hazen Paper and ruling that the
defendant can avoid liquidated damages only if it believed in
good faith and non-recklessly that the statute permitted the
age-based decision. 2 In this case, the defendant was attempt-
ing to avoid the prohibition against mandatory retirement by
broadening the policy. The court stated that "[t]he exemption
protects only those retirement plans which are 'not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of [the ADEA. ' ' 26 The court said the
city could make no argument that it acted in good faith and
nonrecklessly.2"
nonrecklessly, and thereby acted willfully, by not following its own procedures; fur-
thermore, the defendant's actions had shown affirmative bad faith, but the court
noted that it did not have to go that far to find the defendant guilty of a willful
violation).
256. Woodhouse, 92 F.3d at 256.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 257 (citations omitted).
259. No. 92C4919, 1994 WL 46672, at *1 (N.D. IlM. Feb. 14, 1994).
260. See id. at *3.
261. See id. at *4.
262. See id.
263. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(2) (1994)).
264. See id.
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In a district court case, Dittman v. Ireco, Inc.,265 the court,
having earlier granted summary judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff on liability, questioned whether as a matter of law the
plaintiff was also entitled to liquidated damages. The court said
that
once an employer is found to have intentionally discriminat-
ed against an employee in violation of the ADEA, it may
avoid a finding of willfulness if it shows that it acted in
good faith and nonrecklessly. However, under such circum-
stances, this defense is not broad and all encompassing. The
Supreme Court recognizes only three acts of "good faith and
nonrecklessness" which may save the employer from liqui-
dated damages. Specifically: (1) the employer was ignorant
of the correlation between the selection mechanism and age;
(2) the employer believed that age was a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification ("BFOQ"); and (3) the employer believed
the employee was not covered by the ADEA.266
The court said that the first good faith defense would gener-
ally apply only in a disparate impact case. Because this was a
disparate treatment case, the defendant had to show a BFOQ
or another exemption and had not done so. The court found
insufficient the fact that the defendant had "consulted with its
attorneys before implementing the reorganization plan and
discharging the plaintiff."'267 The failure to interpose one of the
two possible defenses was fatal to the defendant's opposition to
liquidated damages.
The argument could be made that consultation with counsel
should provide the "good faith" part of the test, as Thurston
seemed to indicate. The remaining question, then, would be
whether the client was reasonable in relying on counsel's ad-
vice. If, for example, the client provided inaccurate or insuffi-
cient information to its counsel, the client could not reasonably
rely on advice of counsel. As will be discussed later, if the
265. 903 F. Supp. 347 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
266. Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
267. Id. In another district court case, Hysell v. Mercantile Stores Co., 736 F.
Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the court found that the defendant had not committed a
willful violation when it acted on the advice of counsel that the plaintiff was a bona
fide executive who could be mandatorily retired. This case predated Hazen Paper.
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defendant's action in relying on counsel's advice was merely
negligent, liquidated damages should not be awarded.
For example, in Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.,268
the court said that, although the defendant consulted lawyers
with regard to whether the demotion of the plaintiff violated
the ADEA, he did not testify that he reasonably relied in good
faith on their advice." 9 Presumably had the defendant testi-
fied that he relied in good faith, he might have been able to
claim the defense if his reliance was reasonable. In that vein,
in Fink v. Kitzman," the district court, following the good
faith standard, refused to immunize the defendant from puni-
tive damages simply because she consulted an attorney. The
court said that the evidence showed that the defendant targeted
the plaintiff for discharge because of her age and recklessly dis-
charged her in violation of the ADEA.27'
Other courts, while not specifically adopting the good faith
standard, have looked at evidence which would indicate the
existence vel non of good faith. For example, in Parrish v. Im-
manuel Medical Center,72 the court reviewed a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff in which she was awarded liquidated dam-
ages. The court affirmed the judgment, finding sufficient evi-
dence to support the liquidated damages. Among other things,
the court noted, the defendant had implemented a mandatory
retirement plan several years after the ADEA eliminated the
upper age limit and, further, had asked another employee to
retire with the approval of the human resources director who
was presumably responsible for complying with anti-discrimi-
nation laws.273
268. 92 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1996).
269. See id. at 124.
270. 881 F. Supp. 1347 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
271. See id. at 1389-90.
272. 92 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Futrell v. J.I. Case Co., 38 F.3d 342,
349 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendant's "innocuous evidence of age
awareness' becomes significant when combined with other evidence of potential dis-
crimination such as failure to follow procedures in discharging him and discriminatory
remarks"). But see EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244,
1250 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the jury was warranted in not awarding liquidat-
ed damages because, although the plaintiffs harassers knew it was wrong to treat
someone differently based on age, they did not know that they were violating the
ADEA when they did so).
273. See Parrish, 92 F.3d at 736. In later cases, the Eighth Circuit recognized the
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Similarly, in Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc.,2 4 the
court affirmed the jury's verdict awarding the plaintiff punitive
damages based, among other things, on the evidence that the
plaintiff was promoted six months before he was fired but was
never informed of his promotion by his immediate supervisors,
that management officials had discussed offering him early
retirement before they fired him, and that the human resources
director had lacked both training and experience in the
ADEA 5
standard as good faith reasonable belief. See Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., 110
F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that proof of a willful violation did not require
additional evidence but whether the "person making the hiring decision incorrectly
but in good faith believed that the statute permitted an age-based decision"). Here
the jury could have concluded that the interviewer had a younger person picked for
the job and only interviewed the plaintiff to give the appearance of complying with
the ADEA. See id. at 640; see also Maschka v. Genuine Parts Co., 122 F.3d 566, 572
(8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the defendant had policies against age discrimination
and presented no evidence that it acted in the erroneous belief that the action was
permitted by the ADEA); Curtis v. Electronics & Space Corp., 113 F.3d 1498, 1502-03
(8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the supervisor had attended company seminars discuss-
ing the company policy that age discrimination was illegal; while this was insufficient
alone to provide the basis for liquidated damages, the company did not present evi-
dence that it mistakenly believed that the decision was legitimate under the ADEA).
But see Jarvis v. Sauer Sundstrand Co., 116 F.3d 321, 324 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding
"[a] violation of the ADEA does not require any particular mental state, but the
award of liquidated damages under the ADEA does"). Because the plaintiff did not
submit additional evidence in Jarvis, liquidated damages were not appropriate. See
id.
The Eighth Circuit sitting en banc had earlier recognized the error of its ways
in requiring direct evidence in previous cases. In Brown v. Stites Concrete Co., 994
F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1993), the court rejected the instruction proferred by the defendant
that would have required some additional evidence of outrageous conduct to support
the award of liquidated damages. See id. at 559. Instead, it approved the instruction
given in the case which resulted in an award of liquidated damages for the plaintiff:
"[a] violation is willful if ies done voluntarily and deliberately and intentionally and
not by accident or inadvertence or ordinary negligence." Id. at 560. The court found
that voluntariness is insufficient to establish willfulness, but the error was not re-
versible: "[tihe question is not whether the evidence used to establish willfulness is
different from and additional to the evidence used to establish a violation of the
ADEA, but whether the evidence-additional or otherwise-satisfies the distinct stan-
dard used for establishing willfulness." Id. The dissent disagreed that the jury in-
struction stated the law correctly and thought that the defendant had proved that it
acted in good faith reasonable belief that considering the plaintiffs age was legiti-
mate. See id. at 561-62 (Loken, C.J., dissenting).
274. 26 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1994).
275. See id. at 802-03; see also Ryther v. KARE 11, 864 F. Supp. 1510, 1520 (D.
Minn. 1994), affd en banc, 109 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding evidence to support
a willful violation in the defendant's policies prohibiting such discrimination and in
the fact that the defendant built a record against the plaintiff to justify his dis-
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Other courts have found, but not required, the equivalent of
bad faith in order to assess liquidated damages. For example,
in one case, the employer's lying about the reason for the em-
ployment action supported liquidated damages." 6 In another
case, the discrepant responses by defendant's witnesses were
evidence of a willful violation. 7 While there may be some ar-
gument that the courts are interpreting the Hazen Paper-
Thurston standard for "reckless indifference" too strictly,278
they are virtually in harmony in doing so, as compared to the
varying interpretations of "reckless disregard" under Title VII.
V. ANALYSIS
When Congress used the term "reckless indifference" in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, it was not writing on a clean slate.
The Supreme Court interpreted the term in Thurston to mean
that exemplary damages are awardable in the absence of evi-
dence that the defendant believed in good faith based on rea-
sonable grounds that it was not violating the plaintiffs statuto-
ry rights.7 9 The Court affirmed this interpretation again be-
fore 1991,280 and has since rejected a contrary reading in
charge); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting
that the Supreme Court rejected its requirement of outrageous conduct, requiring
instead that the defendant's conduct show reckless disregard of the plaintiffs statuto-
ry rights). The fact that the jury in Starceski could have found that the defendant
specifically targeted the plaintiff and the older engineers in his department for layoff
satisfied the requirement of reckless disregard. See id. at 1099-1100.
276. See EEOC v. Watergate at Landmark Condominium, 24 F.3d 635, 641 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that if the defendant lies about the reason for its action and the
jury finds age discrimination, this would support a finding that the violation was
willful).
277. See EEOC v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1997).
278. By limiting the good faith defense to claims of an enumerated defense to the
ADEA, it could be argued that the courts are interpreting good faith more strictly
than Thurston intended. See infra text accompanying notes 285-87.
279. See 469 U.S. 111, 129 (1985).
280. See generally McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. 486 U.S. 128 (1988). Again,
the 1991 Civil Rights Act uses the term "reckless indifference" as opposed to
Thurston's "reckless disregard." The difference in terminology is irrelevant. The Court
in Smith v. Wade used the term "reckless disregard," and there is no doubt that the
intention is that the standard under both § 1981 and the 1991 Civil Rights Act
should be the same. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The Court further
stated that punitive damages may be inferred from the same evidence from which
liability is found and that "reckless disregard" did not require a heightened showing.
See id.; see also supra note 20.
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Hazen Paper. To re-interpret the meaning of "reckless indiffer-
ence" for a statute as closely related to the ADEA as is Title
VII would be problematic at best, and judicial activism at
worst.
The courts are encountering problems under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 and § 1981 because they have failed to recognize
that the standard for punitive damages does not require more
evidence of the defendant's intent regarding the discriminatory
act. Rather, it requires evidence regarding the defendant's state
of mind with regard to the law, as the. Court recognized in its
ADEA decisions and in Smith v. Wade.
The confusion comes from the fact that liability for these
discrimination claims ostensibly requires a more culpable state
of mind or intent to discriminate than the standard for punitive
damages, which requires that the employer act recklessly. The
distinction should be made between the defendant's intent with
regard to the act of intentionally discriminating and his state of
mind (reckless indifference) with regard to the plaintiffs pro-
tected rights. Intentional discrimination requires only that the
defendant treat the plaintiff differently from another person
because of a prohibited characteristic such as race, sex, religion,
national origin, color, or disability. Reckless indifference to
whether this violates the law is another question. Arguably, the
plaintiff should have to prove that the defendant knew about
the law and was reckless in violating it. Ignorance of the law,
however, has never been a defense under any of the anti-dis-
crimination provisions.28' As the court said in Thurston, every-
one knows discriminating based on age violates the law, and it
would not be enough for liquidated damages to show that the
defendant knew that age discrimination was wrong or "in the
picture."282 Certainly, if most employers know that age dis-
crimination is wrong, it is even more likely that employers
know that race, sex, religion, or national origin discrimination
is wrong.283
281. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32. See generally Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
282. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 127-28.
283. Because discrimination against the disabled is a newer proscription, one could
argue that if knowledge of the law was intended to be part of the proof for punitive
damages, disability discrimination would be the most likely candidate. Congress, how-
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The Supreme Court's interpretation of "reckless indifference"
under the ADEA was to allow the defendant to avoid punitive
damages by showing that its violation of the law was in good
faith based on reasonable belief. This is the only interpretation
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act that makes sense. "Reckless indif-
ference" cannot mean that the defendant's conduct was worse
than simply discriminating. Smith v. Wade held that punitive
damages punish egregious behavior, but the intentional conduct
that violated the Civil Rights Act in that case was considered
egregious enough without requiring more.284 Similarly, simple
discrimination is sufficiently egregious behavior. The clear lan-
guage of the standard for punitive damages relates to the
defendant's intention regarding the law, as does the standard
for liquidated damages under the ADEA. Because no employer
today can or should be able to profess ignorance of the law that
discrimination is illegal, the absence of a good faith reasonable
belief is the only logical meaning of "reckless indifference" to
statutory rights.
Reading between the lines of the Thurston case,285 the argu-
ment can be made, however, that the Supreme Court intended
to allow ignorance of the nuances of the law to be a defense to
exemplary damages. In Thurston, the defendant tried to bring
its retirement policy into compliance with the new amendment
to the ADEA that forbids mandatory retirement. In amending
ever, did not make this distinction, applying the same standard for punitive damages
to the ADA and Title VII. See supra note 19; infra text accompanying notes 297-301.
284. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The actual question in Smith v.
Wade was whether an award of punitive damages requires the defendant to act mali-
ciously or intentionally (in fact, the plaintiff had already proven an intentional viola-
tion which is required under § 1983, as under § 1981) or whether an award of puni-
tive damages requires only "reckless disregard" to federal rights. The Court opted for
the latter, without clearly defining what that would mean, except that it did not re-
quire additional evidence, as courts today are requiring. The Court in Smith v. Wade
quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "Punitive damages may be awarded for
conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others.'" Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATE-
MIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977)).
285. In Thurston, the Court reviewed the defendant's policy that allowed airline pi-
lots who were mandatorily retiring due to age to transfer to flight engineer status.
The transfer was possible only if a vacancy in flight engineering existed. See
Thurston, 469 U.S. at 116. The policy was ultimately found to violate the ADEA be-
cause pilots who retired for reasons other than age could transfer to flight engineer
even if no vacancy existed. See id. at 121-22.
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its policy to remedy the obvious violation, the defendant unin-
tentionally incorporated a new violation in its transfer poli-
cy.2 6 While the policy violated the ADEA, the Supreme Court
said that the violation was not reckless because the defendant
believed in good faith that its new policy conformed to the law
and that the belief was reasonable because the defendant con-
sulted with its legal counsel. The Court's solution to allow the
defendant to show that it thought the discrimination was justi-
fied makes as much sense under Title VII as it does under the
ADEA and more under the ADA.87
The D.C. Circuit's panel and en banc opinions in Kolstad
21
are the only opinions that discuss the applicability of the good
faith reasonable belief standard to the 1991 Civil Rights
Act." 9 The en banc court's reason for rejecting the good faith
standard is based, in part, on a misapprehension that the
ADEA is easier to violate than Title VII.290  The court said
that because of the ADEA's defenses, it would be more likely
for employers to believe that the discrimination is allowed by
the ADEA.291 Most of the important defenses to the ADEA,
286. In this case, the defendant may have been negligent, but recklessness requires
a more culpable state of mind. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 525
n.21. For a discussion of the meaning of "reckless," see supra text accompanying note
129.
287. See infra text accompanying notes 298-304.
288. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd en
banc, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998).
289. "[Tlhe ADEA requires 'willful' conduct, not 'malice' or 'reckless indifference.'"
Id. at 967. The en banc court in Kolstad said that liquidated damages were different
and neglected to mention that the standard is interpreted to be basically the same.
See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 124-28.
290. See Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 967.
291. For example, the court said that many people think retiring people early is
not a violation of the law. See id. As the Court in Thurston said, absent good faith
reasonable belief, this would require imposition of liquidated damages. See Thurston,
469 U.S. at 127-28.
The same argument, that the Act is easier to violate unintentionally, could be
made for violations of the Equal Pay Act, for example, which has several defenses
and depends on a fact-bound assessment of whether the parties in question are doing
equal work. The Equal Pay Act requires that the employer pay the same wages to
men and women who are performing equal work. Equal work is defined as work re-
quiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, performed under the same working con-
ditions. The defenses are (1) any other factor other than sex; (2) a merit system; (3)
a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; and (4) a se-
niority system. See Equal Pay Act of 1963 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994). The Su-
preme Court, nevertheless, applied the same standard to the Equal Pay Act and the
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however, are also defenses to Title VII. Both have a BFOQ and
bona fide seniority system defenses.292 While it is true that
Congress added other defenses to the ADEA that were not
found in Title VII specifically, "reasonable factors other than
age," "bona fide benefit plan," as well as discipline or discharge
for good cause,293 these defenses rarely arise." The most
ADEA. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe, 486 U.S. 128 (1988). The ADEA and
Title VII have more of the same concepts and defenses in common than do the Equal
Pay Act and the ADEA. See generally supra note 50.
292. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e), (h) (1994). The BFOQ defense is not absolute un-
der Title VII but applies only to sex, religious, and national origin discrimination. See
id. § 2000e-2(e). The court in Kolstad assumed that BFOQ would apply more often
under the ADEA than under Title VII. It can be argued that sex as a BFOQ has
been raised as often as age. Compare UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991), with Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
293. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1994). Section 623(f) states that:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a),
(b), (c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational quali-
fication reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age, or where such practices involve an employee in a workplace in
a foreign country, and compliance with such subsections would cause
such employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to violate
the laws of the country in which such workplace is located;
(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a),
(b), (c) or (e) of this section-
(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is
not intended to evade the purposes of this Act, except that no such
seniority system shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of
any individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act because of the age
of such individual; or
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan-
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual
amount of payment made or cost incurred on behalf of an older
worker is no less than that made or incurred on behalf of a youn-
ger worker, as permissible under section 1625.10, Title 29, Code of
Federal Regulations (as in effect on June 22, 1989); or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consis-
tent with the relevant purpose or purposes of this Act.
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), no
such employee benefit plan or voluntary early retirement incentive
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such
employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary re-
tirement of any individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act,
because of the age of such individual. An employer, employment
agency, or labor organization acting under subparagraph (A), or
under clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), shall have the burden
of proving that such actions are lawful in any civil enforcement
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common defense to an ADEA claim is the "legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory reason" that was developed by the courts as a de-
fense to Title VII and applies as well to the ADEA 5 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court has equated legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory reason with a "factor other than age."295 Finally,
the standard for punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of
1991 also applies to the ADA which has defenses of its own. 97
Because the ADA is more recent, employers are less familiar
with its provisions.
The D.C. Circuit's supposition that the ADEA is easier to
violate accidentally than Title VII would apply with more force
to the ADA, which has even more traps for the unwary than
the ADEA or Title VII.29 For example, in Bartlett v. New
York Board of Law Examiners,2 99 the court decided that the
proceeding brought under this chapter; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
Id. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Defense:
The Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155, 176-77
(1986).
294. See generally Eglit, supra note 293.
295. See id.
296. Johnson, Semantic Cover, supra note 29, at 24. The Court held that
"[although some language in our prior decisions might be read to mean that an
employer violates the ADEA whenever its reason for firing an employee is improper
in any respect, this reading is obviously incorrect." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 612 (1993) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) (a Title VII case)). There are, in addition, defenses under Title VII which are
not contained in the ADEA, such as action taken pursuant to a merit system or a
system which measures quantity or quality of production or a professionally developed
test. These are as rarely used as some of the ADEA defenses. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1994). The defenses of merit system and quantity or quality of production are
also included in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994), which
share the same standard for liquidated damages as the ADEA. See supra note 291.
297. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,117(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
298. For example, it is illegal under the ADA for the defendant to ask an appli-
cant about medical problems before she is hired. See id.; see also EEOC v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that punitive damages were
appropriate where, after the ADA became applicable to it, the defendant neglected to
change its nationwide interview form, which asked an illegal question about
applicants' medical condition).
An actor acts recklessly if he "consciously disregards a substantial risk," that
the prohibited result will occur. See Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 537.
He acts negligently if he "should have been aware of an unreasonable" risk that the
prohibited result would occur. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
299. 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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plaintiff had been discriminated against because the defendant
failed to reasonably accommodate her learning disability in
administering the bar exam to her.3"0 Nevertheless, the court
held that even if punitive damages were available, because of
the "'chaos' in the learning disability field" 30' and the "ambi-
guity in the law," the defendant did not act with reckless indif-
ference to the plaintiffs rights.0 2
Even the court in Kolstad acknowledged that Smith v. Wade
rejected the requirement of "'actual malicious intent--"ill will,
spite, or intent to injure,"' 30 3 but then required egregiousness
as a threshold requirement. The court declined to define the
term, but found that there was no evidence of egregiousness in
the Kolstad case because the plaintiff contended only that the
defendant had preselected a male for the position and had
made offensive references to women. The court said examples of
egregiousness include where a defendant (1) "engaged in a per-
vasive pattern of discriminatory acts," (2) "manifested genuine
spite and malevolence," or (3) "otherwise evinced a 'criminal in-
difference to civil obligations.' 3 4
It is difficult to reconcile the requirement of egregiousness,
and the Kolstad court's explanation of the term, with Smith v.
Wade's rejection of a requirement of malice or ill will. The
300. This case was decided under another Title of the ADA, not the Title that
applies to employment discrimination.
301. Id. at 1135.
302. Id. at 1134. The ADA also has a good faith defense for the employer who
offers a reasonable accommodation. At least one court has equated lack of good faith
under the ADA with reckless indifference. In Oswald v. LaRoche Chemicals, 894 F.
Supp. 988 (E.D. La. 1995), the court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of good faith efforts to find a reasonable accommodation. The
court found that the defendant may have acted recklessly with regard to the
plaintiffs rights. The company consulted a physician who determined that the
plaintiff could not perform other jobs. Testimony indicated that the physician re-
viewed the plaintiffs medical file once, never visited the plant to view any of the
possible positions, relied on the defendant's representatives to tell him the job duties,
and did not remember being consulted on the job plaintiff applied for and was de-
nied. See id. at 997.
In Mason v. Salvation Army, 112 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997), without citing the
statutory authorization, the court decided that an award of punitive damages was not
supported by the evidence because the defendant had made a number of accommoda-
tions to the plaintiff. See id.
303. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 37 (1983)).
304. Id. at 965 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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courts that require egregious violations are simply requiring
some type of malice or ill will.3 5 As the dissent in Kolstad
pointed out, the courts are usurping the jury's function of decid-
ing when to make the moral judgment of when the employer
should be punished. Under the standard of egregiousness, judg-
es cannot instruct juries on when to assess punitive damages
but can only apply a hindsight view of the evidence and arbi-
trarily decide whether they think the defendant's conduct was
egregious or not. °6 Furthermore, the standard is "malice or
reckless indifference" and requiring egregious behavior is the
equivalent of reading "reckless indifference" out of the statute.
The absurdity of the situation is best illustrated by the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Ngo. The court acknowledged that Smith v.
Wade was the authoritative interpretation of the standard and
that it rejected the argument that the standard for punitive
damages must necessarily be higher than the standard for
liability. 7 The court said, however, that many other courts
had, nevertheless, misinterpreted Smith v. Wade to require a
heightened evidentiary showing for punitive damages. The court
in Ngo then adopted the misinterpretation on the assumption
that Congress had also adopted the misinterpretation. While
admitting that the defendant may have been reckless, the court
further required "evil motive or a conscious and deliberate dis-
regard," a clearly higher standard than that required by the
statute in order to impose punitive damages. °5
305. See, e.g., Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir.
1998), amended on pet. for reh'g, 156 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring an evil
motive, presumably racial hatred).
It should be noted that courts that find malice are correct but those that re-
quire it are not. Malice is sufficient for punitive damages, but the minimum standard
is reckless indifference. For a discussion of malice, see supra note 98.
306. See Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 976-77 (Latel, J., dissenting). Compare Merriweather
v. Family Dollar Stores of Ind., Inc., 103 F.3d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1996) (determining
that the defendant's "attempt to deceive the court, by presenting false reasons for its
decision to discharge [the plaintiffl, was sufficiently serious that it warranted imposi-
tion of punitive damages"), with Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d
1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the company was on notice of the incidents
and failed to remedy them, but defendant's conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to
justify an award of punitive damages where the plaintiffs complaints to management
that an employee had sexually assaulted her were ignored).
307. See id. 1302-03.
308. Id. at 1305. The jury found that the defendant intentionally discriminated.
The only remaining question addresses what the defendant's belief was with regard to
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has two choices in the Kolstad case. If it
chooses to interpret the standard to require more evidence of
bad conduct on the part of the defendant in order to impose
punitive damages, it will perpetuate the chaos in the lower
courts. As evidenced by lower court cases, courts do not agree
on what bad conduct is sufficiently bad for punitive damag-
es."0 9 Furthermore, if the Court chooses this solution, it would
also either have to overrule or "clarify" Smith v. Wade to re-
quire more evidence or apply a different standard to § 1981
cases.
The second choice, recommended by this article, is to inter-
pret "reckless indifference" consistently and apply Thurston to
the 1991 Civil Rights Act. In order to avoid an award of puni-
tive damages, there must be some evidence that the defendant
believed that he was acting in good faith based on reasonable
grounds that he was not discriminating. 1 ° The jury must then
make a moral judgment of whether the employer should be
punished to deter such conduct in the future.311 The Court
need not limit the defendant to proof that it mistakenly be-
whether it was violating the plaintiffs rights in refusing her a medical leave, but
granting a white employee leave to go on her honeymoon. The court admitted that
the defendant may have been reckless, which is all that is required by the statute,
but would require that the defendant have an evil motive, i.e., racial hatred, or an
intentional disregard for the plaintiffs rights. See id.
309. See cases cited supra Part III.B.
310. Again, under Title VII, to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that the defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(1) (1994). It is the position of this article that once the plaintiff has shown
that the defendant intentionally discriminated, the plaintiff has met this burden. It
should be incumbent on the defendant to prove that he acted in good faith based on
reasonable grounds.
In the alternative, the defendant could be required to articulate a defense
which the plaintiff would then be required to disprove. "Punitive damages should be
awarded when the defendant deserves to be punished, and the award would deter
him and others from such conduct in the future." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
908(1) (1977). If the defendant intentionally discriminated, he clearly deserves punish-
ment in most cases because he has done a great social and moral wrong proscribed
by federal law. If, however, he was acting in good faith based on reasonable grounds,
he should not be assessed punitive damages.
311. It must be remembered that damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are
not unlimited but capped at $300,000 (punitive and compensatory) for the largest
employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (1994).
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lieved that it had a statutory defense. The defendant could be
allowed to present other evidence that it was acting in good
faith based on reasonable grounds that it was not discriminat-
ing. For example, the recent decision in Ellerth could provide
guidance in cases such as hostile environment harassment cases
where the defendant has an anti-discrimination policy, has
trained its supervisors not to discriminate, and has no reason
to believe that discriminatory decisions were being made at the
supervisory level.312 In Thurston itself, the defendant was
clearly trying to comply with the law. With regard to the dis-
criminatory transfer policy, the defendant could not contend
that it believed that the policy was non-discriminatory; howev-
er, in the context of the defendant's overall conduct, it was
clear that the defendant was trying to remedy a mandatory
retirement policy when it negligently created the discriminatory
transfer policy. In addition, there may be other instances of
good faith reasonable belief that would show that the defendant
should not be punished with punitive damages.313 Requiring
further evidence that the defendant was intentionally discrimi-
nating does not speak to whether the defendant was reckless
with regard to the law.
Whether the present Court agrees with Smith v. Wade at
this point in time or with the earlier interpretation of "reckless
disregard" in Thurston, these were the relevant decisions when
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Requiring an egre-
gious or malicious"4 violation simply reads "reckless indiffer-
ence" out of the statute, and any such requirement must be the
subject of legislative, not judicial action.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 210-13; supra note 213.
313. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New York Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
314. See supra notes 98, 102; Johnson, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 534-38
(discussing the meaning of the term malice).
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